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“The meaning of preference . . . may be illustrated by
this well-known exchange among three baseball umpires. ‘I
call them as I see them,’ said the first. ‘I call them as they
are,’ claimed the second. The third disagreed, ‘[t]hey ain’t
nothing till I call them.’”1
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists traditionally assume that preferences are
fixed.2 But, as a recent paper noted, “[t]his assumption has
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1
. Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preferences, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364,
364 (1995) (quoting Amos Tversky & Richard Thaler, Anomalies:
Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 210 (1990)). Jerome Bruner also
recounts this story. See Jerome Bruner, What is a Narrative Fact?, 560
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17, 19–20 (1998).
2
. See C. CHRISTIAN VON WEIZSÄCKER, PREPRINTS OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR
RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES 2
(2005), http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2005_ 11online.pdf (“Traditional
neo-classical economics has worked with the assumption that preferences
of agents in the economy are fixed.”); see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976); Samuel Bowles, Endogenous
Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic
Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 75 (1998) (“Markets and other
economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they also
influence the evolution of values, tastes and personalities. Economists have
long assumed otherwise; the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old as
liberal political philosophy itself.”); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and
Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998). For the purposes of this
article, the terms “exogenous preferences” and “fixed preferences” can
fairly be treated as synonymous. See Brett McDonnell, Endogenous
Preferences and Welfare Evaluations, in NORMS AND VALUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
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always been disputed and, indeed, in the social sciences
outside of neoclassical economics the assumption has never
been accepted by anyone. Modern economics . . . has raised
addition-al doubts about the realism of this behavioural
assumption.”3 Indeed, preference construction is a hot topic
in many fields, the behavioral sciences generally and
psychology most significantly.4 And it has also long been an
important topic in philosophy.5
The manner by which preferences are constructed is

(Aristides Hatzis, ed., forthcoming). Traditional law and economics scholars
generally assume preferences are fixed, given that their underlying
assumptions are those of economics. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Symposium:
Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of
Consumer Choice: Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 11 (2006); Russell
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 623–25 (1998).
3
. WEIZSÄCKER, supra note 2, at 2; see, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR
TASTES 18–23 (1996) (noting that while economists treat preferences using
the traditional model, preferences need to be viewed as endogenous); LOUIS
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 411 n.30 (2002) (citing to
materials that “mov[e] from the idea that individuals may learn
probabilities—information—over time to the idea that individuals may learn
about their own utility functions over time . . . and . . . discussing changes
in tastes and imperfect information about future preferences.”); Dan Ariely
et al., Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable
Preferences, 118 Q. J. ECON. 73, 73–75 (2003) [hereinafter Ariely, Coherent
Arbitrariness]; Dan Ariely et al., Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value,
60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 2 (2006) [hereinafter Ariely, Tom Sawyer];
Bowles, supra note 2, at 76 (“One risks banality, not controversy, in
suggesting that . . . allocation rules . . . influence the process of human
development, affecting personality, habits, tastes, identities and values.”);
Gregory W. Fischer et al., Goal-based Construction of Preferences: Task
Goals and the Prominence Effect, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1057, 1058 (1999);
Korobkin, supra note 2, at 675 (“[T]he preference exogeneity argument,
implicit in all law and economics theories of efficient contract default rule
selection, is probably false . . . .”); McDonnell, supra note 2, at 6.
[T]he economist’s assumption of exogenous preferences is
false for a large and important set of circumstances . . . few
would deny [this]. Even some of those economists who insist
most strongly on the exogenous preference assumption grant
that it is factually false, and importantly so. Indeed, a coauthor of the leading article arguing for the exogeneity
assumption, Gary Becker, went on to develop theories in which
preferences are in some sense endogenous . . . even Richard
Posner, the leading exponent of law and economics, grants that
sometimes the law affects preferences.
Id.; see also John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences:
Towards a Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 245 (1999). The
authors also discuss how legal rules can affect preferences. KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra at 413–18; see also Drew Fudenberg, Advancing Beyond
“Advances in Behavioral Economics”, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 694 (2006); Jörg
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necessarily of significant interest for law.6 Consider the
extensive resources devoted to state-sponsored or statecertified education as well as public-awareness and publicinterest campaigns. Consider, too, the many instances in
which the public (or some subset’s) preference supports
action. That preferences are constructed suggests that the
process by which they are elicited matters—people do not
simply have preferences that are invariant to the mode of
elicitation, a point made forcefully by Paul Slovic 7 and others,
and borne out by extensive research. One finding of obvious
importance: Group deliberation, as occurs when juries make
decisions, can yield different results than individual
deliberation.8
It is therefore not surprising that law and economics
scholars, especially those within behavioral law and
economics, 9 increasingly acknowledge that preferences are
often constructed,10 consider what legal contexts preference
Rieskamp et al., Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and
Theories of Preferential Choice, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 631 (2006).
4
. See THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic
eds., 2006). The law and sociology scholar Lauren B. Edelman notes that
“[i]n contrast to the fixed and stable preferences that determine social
behavior in L&E [Law and Economics], L&S [Law and Society] sees social
action as responsive to institutions, norms and historical context.” Lauren
B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 181, 187 (2004).
5
. One of the earliest discussions of the topic is in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS. See infra note 100.
6
. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(regarding the importance of preference construction for law); Bowles,
supra note 2, at 75; McDonnell, supra note 2, at 7.
7
. Slovic, supra note 1, at 364.
8
. An extensive literature exists.
One recent example is David
Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 915
(2007).
9
. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 675. See generally BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1.
Human preferences and values are constructed rather than elicited
by social situations . . . . Human beings do not generally consult a
freestanding ‘preference menu’ from which selections are made at
the moment of choice; preferences can be a product of procedure,
description and context at the time of choice.
Id.
10
. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1–2.
[P]references can be a product of procedure, description and
context at the time of choice: “Alternative descriptions of the same
choice problems lead to systematically different preferences;
strategically equivalent elicitation procedures give rise to different
choices; and the preference between x and y often depends on the
choice set within which they are embedded.”
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construction might matter in, and how it might matter.11 In
particular, law and economics scholars are increasingly
noting that law itself is a mechanism by which preferences
are constructed.12
For the most part, the critique focuses on the
economists’ positive claim that preferences are fixed. But
the economists’ claim is not just positive—it is also
normative. Preferences that are not as economists posit are
not infrequently, and perhaps even typically, characterized
as “irrational.” Behavioral law and economics scholars
Id. (quoting Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 185 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1996)). This point is especially important for law. The legal system is
“pervasively in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions and
contexts for choice.” Id. at 2; see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3
(expressing the concern that a society or lawmaker’s view of what others
prefer (or ‘should’ prefer) will be imposed on people on the rationale that it
would be good if people did not like such things); Neal Katyal, Deterrence’s
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2461 (1997) (arguing that preferences are
not exogenous and that legal systems can shape tastes, and that
preference formation and substitution can be examined using psychology
and cognitive bias); Tracey L. Meares et al., Symposium: Punishment and
Its Purposes, Updating The Study Of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171,
1180 (2004) (noting that “[t]raditional understandings of deterrence ignore
a wealth of research from psychology about the way in which people frame
choices,” giving as an example a circumstance in which people might
choose A over B, but if C is also offered, people might be more apt to pick B
over A); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 421
(2006).
Interestingly, Richard Posner himself, someone staunchly
antipaternalistic, has used reasoning that smacks of what Kaplow and
Shavell object to. For example, see Morin Building Products Co. v.
Baystone Construction, Inc., 717 F.2d. 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1983), in which
Posner concludes that the parties probably did not intend to subject one
party’s obligation to the other party’s “aesthetic whim” notwithstanding
language in the contract that says they did. Posner apparently reasoned
that where the obligation at issue was one which parties ought to deem
was not subject to “aesthetic whim,” that in this case it also was not. All
this being said, some scholarship arguably makes too much of preference
construction. In this article, I argue for a more nuanced approach.
11
. One legal scholar who has written extensively about the issue is
Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1–2;
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R.
Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2638
(1998);Symposium, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives
and Legal Implications, 151 U. PENN. L. REV . 707 (2003). He and some other
scholars now argue that the law should “nudge” people toward more
desirable behavior and preferences. The theory underlying this approach is
more formally called libertarian, or soft, paternalism. See generally RICHARD
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
12
. See, e.g., Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 11, at 220;
SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 11; KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3 (discussing
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sympathetic to constructed preferences often implicitly
accept this normative position,13 especially insofar as they
characterize some preference construction as anomalous or
a mistake. Consider some of the paradigmatic examples,
such as one in which a treatment is alternately presented as
curing 80% of people or as failing to cure 20% of people;
Smith favors the first treatment over the (identical) second
treatment.14
Here, “irrationality” seems like a fair
assessment.
Indeed, Smith may very well have more
difficulties in life than will his doppelganger, who
various mechanisms by which law might affect preferences).
The suggestion is often made that, if the law symbolically
announces some preferences or reinforces others by appearing to
embody certain viewpoints, individuals will come to adopt different
preferences and, in turn, to behave differently. For example, social
norms—which, as we discuss in [another section], influence
individuals’ behavior and tend to have the character of tastes—
may be influenced by whether they are reinforced or in tension
with prevailing legal rules.
Id. at 415. Kaplow and Shavell also discuss views about other types of
situations in which law might change preferences, including that “laws may
directly change people’s experiences, which in turn can influence people’s
preferences and behavior and . . . that the process of considering which
laws to adopt may itself affect preferences.” Id. See also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 2 (“[L]aw can construct rather than elicit
preferences internally, by affecting what goes on in court, and externally,
by affecting what happens in ordinary transactions, market and
nonmarket.”); Korobkin, supra note 2, at 611 (“My thesis is that when
lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive preferences
of contracting parties shift—that term becomes more desirable, and other
competing terms become less desirable.”). A related and more general
point has been made: that a default option is often seen as endorsed by
those offering the option. See note 125, infra. See also McDonnell, supra
note 2.
It may well be that for many of the traditional problems that
economists think about, the exogenous preference assumption is
not too far wrong. However, the assumption becomes more
dubious in the domain of law and economics. The most obvious
concern is the effect of laws on social norms, a topic much
discussed over the last decade or so.
Id. at 6.
13
. I do not want to say they always accept the position. My point here
is simply that the bulk of the scholarship expressly disputes the positive,
descriptive claim. Sometimes, the evidence used against the positive claim
is characterized as a normative failing; other times, normative concerns
are simply not addressed. See Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and
Categorical Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2003) (“[T]he general
tenor of [studies showing that rational choice theory is descriptively
incorrect] is not to question the normative ideal of maximization. Rather,
the departures from the standard account of rational choice are typically
characterized, and criticized, as failures to be rational.”). A standard line of
argument is (a) economists assume preferences are fixed; (b) they are
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understands the equivalence of these two options.15 But
preference construction is not simply a caricatured and more
general version of this type of framing, where two identical
options are assessed differently.16 This type of mistake,
however common, is fairly characterized as irrational;17
preference construction more broadly is not.
My article argues that preference construction, properly
understood, is not normatively undesirable. Having fixed
preferences means having a complete and stable rank
ordering of what we want that dictates our choices. But we
often do not have such an ordering18—and, I will argue,
rationally so. I am not the first to make the argument that
the rational choice model’s normative claims are not well
grounded.19 But much of the work thus far simply notes that
there is nothing to support the model’s normative claims,
especially given its descriptive failings: the model is not true
and there is no reason to suppose it would be. I argue
instead for an alternative model, a process-based model of
preference construction.
Such a model can potentially
explain some important anomalies that violate the
wrong; (c) we need to take into account that experimental evidence shows
preferences are constructed; and (d) here is a context in which preference
construction matters in the following way.
14
. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1102–03 (2000).
15
. That being said, an argument can be made for the value of having a
more optimistic perspective. I discuss this possibility in the next Section.
16
. See Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L. J. 563 (2004) (discussing the tendency
of behavioral law and economics to cast deviations from the orthodox
rational person model as mistakes—mistakes that are systematic and
persist, and are sometimes adaptive, but that are mistakes nonetheless).
17
. That being said, many instances involve what I call self-limiting
irrationality. See infra notes 53–56 and the accompanying text.
18
. More precisely, we may have such an ordering at the moment at
which we make a choice, but the ordering is with respect to the particular
context; the ordering will almost certainly change. This kind of ordering is
consistent with rational choice theory but if we only have orderings at the
time of choice, the theory is almost a tautology and largely useless.
19
. The best argument for the rational choice theory’s normative claims
is the Dutch-book/money-pump argument. I discuss at length in notes 49–
56, infra and accompanying text, why the Dutch-book argument does not
suffice as a normative grounding for the rational choice theory. For
criticisms of the economists’ normative position, see Rabin, supra note 2 ,
at 41 and Rieskamp et al., supra note 3, at 631. See also Chapman, supra
note 13, at 1170; B. A. Mellers et al., Judgment and Decision Making, 49
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 447, 450 (1998) (noting the increasing discussion of
alternatives to the rational choice model).

CLAIRE A. HILL, "THE RATIONALITY OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION (AND
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 689-742 (2008).

THE IRRATIONALITY OF

RATIONAL CHOICE)," 9(2)

2008]

PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
695
traditional model.20
My account of preference construction is very much in
the spirit of “reason-based choice,” as articulated by Eldar
Shafir, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tverksy,21 and
“categorical reason,” as articulated by Bruce Chapman,22 as
well as Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler’s “case-based
decision theory”23 and Daniel Keys and Barry Schwartz’s
theory of “leaky rationality.” Keys’s and Schwartz’s theory
rejects rationality defined “formally” in favor of a broader
account that “takes subjective experience seriously,
considers both direct and indirect consequences of
decisions, and considers the effects of decisions on others.”24
More broadly, my account is in the spirit of Herbert Simon’s
attempts to shift economics from “substantive rationality” to
“procedural rationality.”25 Thus far, there has not been
20

. For a very useful discussion of anomalies not captured by the
traditional model, see Arthur Markman & Douglas L. Medin, Decision
Making, in MEMORY AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 413, 413–66 (Hal Pashler et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2002); see also Chapman, supra note 13, at 1170; Eldar Shafir et al.,
Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 597 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
21
. Shafir et al., supra note 20.
22
. Chapman, supra note 13, at 1172; see also Viktor Vanberg, Rational
Choice, Rule-Following and Institutions: An Evolutionary Perspective, in
RATIONALITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 171–200 (Uskali Maki et al.
eds., 1993).
23
. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 659, 661 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
Gilboa and Schmeidler correctly critique expected utility models on
grounds that “in many decision problems, states of the world are neither
naturally given, nor can they be simply formulated. Furthermore, often
even a comprehensive list of all possible outcomes is not readily available
or easily imagined.” Id. at 659–60. But their alternative oversimplifies: they
“suggest that people choose acts based on their performance in similar
problems in the past.” Id. “Similarity” determinations are not any more
automatic than the determination of the possible choice set for a decision.
The determination that A and B are similar could be otherwise depending
on the same sorts of factors I will discuss in the text regarding how
narratives are formed. Consider: similarity to what end? My toaster and
cranberry juice are both similar in being red. Are they more similar to one
another than my toaster is to my food processor?
24
. Daniel J. Keys & Barry Schwartz, “Leaky” Rationality: How Research
on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards on
Rationality, 2 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 162, 162 (2007).
25
. See, e.g., Herbert Simon, From Substantive to Procedural
Rationality, in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 65–86 (Frank Hahn & Martin
Hollis eds., 1979). Note that Keys & Schwartz, supra note 24, speak
approving of “substantive rationality.” However, they are using the terms
differently than Simon does. “Formal” rationality, in Keys & Schwartz’s
parlance, is the same as “substantive rationality” in Simon’s parlance.
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much elaboration of the elements of a process-based
account of preferences. I hope in this article to make the
case for such an account’s potential explanatory power, as
well as its tractability; I hope as well to suggest some
unifying themes for further exploration of the processes at
issue. One such theme is that of conservation of cognitive
resources or, more colloquially, bang for the buck. The
complete and stable rank orderings hypothesized by the
traditional model, even if they were possible, would entail a
significant and unnecessary expenditure of cognitive
resources.
I argue that rather than having a complete rank
ordering, we have ways of making choices. We construct
narratives, using evaluative criteria against a backdrop of
wants, desires and inclinations, some of which we rank order
and some of which we do not. The evaluative criteria embed
a consideration of transaction costs: critically, where a
decision is not very consequential, a formulaic decision rule
that permits a ready choice among roughly comparable
alternatives may serve our purposes better than a more
considered alternative-by-alternative assessment.
Our
wants, desires and inclinations are for both traditional
objects of choice and higher order values and desires; they
are both previously constructed and constructed and elicited
in the choice-making process.26 Our preferences are arrayed
on a continuum. At one end, preferences are quite
narratively independent, often involving unmediated drives
and desires with very singular realizations, such as drinking
liquid when one is thirsty; 27 at the other end, preferences
What they mean by “substantive rationality” has significant overlap with
what Simon means by “procedural rationality.”
26
. See Gilboa & Schmeidler, supra note 23, at 661 (“[E]xpected utility
theory does not describe the way people “really” think about [decision
making under uncertainty] . . . . Correspondingly, it is doubtful that
[expected utility theory] is the most useful tool for predicting behavior in
applications of this nature. A theory that will provide a more faithful
description of how people think would have a better chance or predicting
what they will do.”).
27
. Interestingly, Becker, supra note 3, notes that
Much of modern economics still proceeds on the implicit
assumption that the main determinants of preferences are the
basic biological needs for food, drink, shelter and some recreation.
That may not be a bad approach for the very poorest countries,
where families spend over half their incomes on food and another
quarter on shelter, and where adult males manage only a few
hours of true leisure each week . . . . It should be obvious that basic
needs for food, shelter and rest have little to do with the average
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are
quite
narratively
dependent,
often
involving
instantiations of higher-order preferences, such as choosing
a particular career for its prestige, income, and other
features.
This account of preference construction matters for legal
scholarship in three ways. First, it helps make the intuitive
case that preference construction is not a simple mistake,
heuristic, or bias that can be viewed as exceptional, a
deviation from the more general default of the neoclassical
model. To the contrary, preference construction is a rational
way to conserve cognitive resources; preferences are made
determinate (only?) as needed. None of this is to say, of
course, that we can never treat preferences as fixed; as I
argued above, many preferences are fixed enough. It is a
safe bet, for instance, that most people will do a great deal
to avoid going to jail. Indeed, an important part of the
preference construction research agenda is to systematically
determine when preference construction does not matter, or
does not matter much.
Second, it suggests some unifying principles to be
considered in developing a process-based alternative to the
present model of preferences, and consistent with those
principles, some possible determinants of preferences.
Critically, my account looks to cost-minimization: of a piece
with our narratives are decision rules that aim importantly to
minimize costs not only of decision-making but also of
informing ourselves about, and categorizing, ourselves and
the world. While my work in this regard is necessarily very
preliminary, I hope that it can suggest useful ways to explore
the determinants of preferences, complementing and
making use of the extensive work now being done by
behavioral scientists in the area. Consider in this regard my
observations in the preceding paragraphs about narratively
independent preferences’ resistance to change relative to
narratively dependent preferences.
Third, my account of preference construction furthers
what I have elsewhere characterized as the next wave of
behavioral law and economics—the search for more realism
as to how people understand and make decisions, and how
person’s choice of consumption and other activities in modern
economies.
Id. at 3. In other words, the preferences I characterize as narratively
independent are the paradigmatic preferences on which traditional
economists base their theories.
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they perceive their own interests.28
The first wave of behavioral law and economics implicitly
hypothesized a false dichotomy: people either come to
correct conclusions or make mistakes. Indeed, the first wave
typically spoke of preference construction as a mistake; a
paradigmatic example was of differing reactions to an 80%
cure rate and a 20% failure rate. But the process of
preference construction is something other than a potential
source of mistakes. Preferences help us define who we are;
as our preferences are constructed, we come to understand
the world and ourselves.
The first wave also implicitly hypothesized another false
dichotomy: people are either self-interested or altruistic.
That dichotomy implicitly characterizes self-interest as
antithetical to others’ interests. But preferences are not just
for scarce objects of choice, where A’s acquisition of such an
object (for instance, a raise from a limited bonus pool) might
be at B’s expense. Indeed, they are often for higher-order
values and ideals, including those that might not be
antithetical to, or might even further, others’ interests.
Consider in this regard a preference for thinking one lives in
a just world.29
More realism, by itself, might not be sufficient to justify
my endeavor; economists typically argue, especially when
defending unrealistic assumptions, that what matters is
predictive power.
In my view, a richer account of
28

. See Hill, supra note 16.
. Elaborating on the example, I may contribute time and effort to
secure the release of a prisoner wrongly convicted in remote country X; in
large part, I may be motivated by wanting to believe I live in a just world
where being innocent pays off. I am therefore not being purely altruistic;
indeed, I am acting very much in accordance with my self-interest.
Believing that I live in a just world is an important part of my life, helping
me conclude that working hard and generally obeying the rules is
worthwhile. But for the just world concern, I might not be motivated to act:
Any instrumental motive for my behavior is obscure and remote at best.
What is the chance that a good outcome for the prisoner will affect laws
generally or in my country, will prevent the fomenting of unrest that could
hurt me, or that the person, imprisoned unjustly for a number of years, will
leave jail angry and do damage that could hurt me? Presumably zero. The
just-world effect has been discussed in the literature, although in quite a
different context: blaming a crime victim in order to sustain a belief in a
just world. See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION
(1980); Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, The Just World Theory, 3 ISSUES
ETHICS
(1990),
available
at
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/justworld. html.
I am
presently writing an article entitled “Rationality in an Unjust World,” in
which I expand on some of the issues I discuss in this note.
29
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preferences should lead to more explanatory power—and
better predictions. Ultimately, my hope is that a better
understanding of the determinants of preferences can have
a significant normative payoff, helping inform policy and
policymakers as to how best to influence behavior. My
critiques and affirmative account here are a very preliminary
step in that direction.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the
neoclassical assumption that preferences are fixed,
considering the positive and normative justifications for the
assumption.
With increasing numbers of economists
agreeing that, as a descriptive and positive matter, the fixed
preferences assumption is certainly not true and may even
not be true enough for many of the purposes they seek to
use it for, my characterization of the fixed preferences
assumption as the neoclassical economists’ position is in
some, and perhaps in significant, measure foil and
expository device. Section 3 discusses the shortcomings of
the traditional economists’ account in explaining advertising.
Section 4 sets forth my alternative process-based account,
articulating the unifying principles and some possible
determinants of preferences. Section 5 considers a few
examples illuminated by my account: justifications for
paternalism, contingent valuation, and negotiations in
complex business contracting. Section 6 concludes.

2. CRITIQUING THE NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS’ VIEW
Neoclassical economics holds that preferences are
fixed.30 The more formal articulations tend to emphasize
stability and coherence: as Matt Rabin notes, “[e]conomics
has conventionally assumed that each individual has stable
and coherent preferences.”31
Coherence usually means
transitivity: if Ann prefers apples to oranges and oranges to
bananas, she prefers apples to bananas.32
Invariance,
30

. To say that preferences are fixed and not constructed is also to say
that preferences are (known or) discovered rather than created. While
economists do not expressly use the discovery/creation distinction, the
vocabulary of discovery pervades economics as well as law and economics
—consider in this regard the agency cost/lemons models, with their focus
on acquiring information from those who, for self-serving reasons, are not
revealing it.
31
. Rabin, supra note 2, at 11; see also Becker, supra note 2, at 5
(“preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time”).
32
. There are also the time-inconsistent preferences: consumption now,
having resources later, or eat cake now, be thin later, the explanations for
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independent of stability, is also part of the account: a
preference will not “change” if it is elicited in different ways.
A typical example: If I favor a treatment with an 80%
success rate, I will not reject the same treatment when it is
presented as having a 20% failure rate. Nor will I rank order
differently my preference for saving forests vs. oceans if I
am asked in different ways.33
But the assumptions go further. As Ariely, Loewenstein &
Prelec note, “[m]odern economics assumes that exogenous
consumer preferences interact with ‘technologies’ and initial
endowments to produce equilibrium prices and production
levels.”34
The key word here is “exogenous.” The
preferences exist, amenable to being discovered or
revealed.35
Preferences have, in the neo-classical
economists’ world, another important attribute as well—they
are “complete”36 or “well-defined”37 and “determinate.”
Determinacy, stability, and invariance are related, part of
the strong-form characterization of preferences as existing
to be discovered.
What evidence do economists have for their assumptions
about preferences—that is, for their positive claim? Empirical
evidence provides, at best, mixed support.38 Certainly, many
experimental results contradict neo-classical economists’
assumptions.39 Some of the empirics may be questioned, on
one or a combination of the following rationales:
experiments may be badly done, effects can perhaps be
reversed by learning, institutional mechanisms will often
compensate such that the effect will not be observed in real
which turn on different rates of discounting. See George Loewenstein &
Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an
Interpretation, 107 Q. J. ECON. 573, 573–75 (1992); Rabin, supra note 2, at
38–41. See generally Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J. L.
& LIBERTY 444 (2007) (discussing choice between present-preferring and
future-preferring conduct).
33
. See Slovic, supra note 1, at 364–65.
34
. Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 9.
35
. See id.
36
. Id.
37
. Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46
EUR. ECON. REV. 657, 660 (2002).
38
. Slovic, supra note 1; Rabin, supra note 2 (both summarize a
considerable amount of empirical evidence).
39
. See Rabin, supra note 2; Slovic, supra note 1; Chapman, supra note
13, at 1173–88; Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 491 (2002). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6
(containing a broad cross-section of articles summarizing theoretical and
empirical work in the field).
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life, or the experiments have some other defect that calls
their validity into question.40 Indeed, these are the familiar
critiques in traditional law and economics’ early responses to
behavioral law and economics.41 But the results are robust.42
Neo-classical economics has a considerable stake in
economists’ assumptions about preferences being true. If
preferences do not accord with economists’ assumptions,
core axioms of rational choice models, on which economics
relies, are violated.43 Moreover, an important economists’
credo is that assumptions need not be realistic or true—just
40

. See Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (1998).
41
. See, e.g., id. at 1572; Ariel Rubinstein, Comments on Behavioral
Economics, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: 2005 WORLD CONGRESS OF THE
ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 246–54 (R. Blundell et al. eds., 2006) (critiquing the
methodology often used by behavioral economists). Another response,
against behavioral economics and behavioral law and economics more
generally is as follows: the standard economics model is an affirmative
model, elegant and developed, and all the behavioral scholars have to offer
thus far are piecemeal critiques and no substitute model. This response
and criticism is completely accurate, but so what? Modeling an alternative
will prove exceedingly difficult, but why should it take a theory to beat a
theory? It may be that realism (and predictive power) demands, and
explanation and prediction will be much improved by, a model far less
elegant than the neo-classical rational choice model. That being said, it is
hard to dispute that at this point, behavioral economics, and behavioral law
and economics, is more promise than results. And there is no reasoned
and definitive response to those who think it does take a theory to beat a
theory.
42
. See Chapman, supra note 13, at 1170 (“The literature is now
huge . . . .”). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6;
Markman & Medin, supra note 20; Rabin, supra note 2; Slovic, supra note 1.
In much the same spirit as Slovic’s piece, Matt Rabin very humorously
shows how economists attempt to salvage pet views in the face of
convincing evidence to the contrary. Rabin hypothesizes the existence of a
planet, “Nonhollywood,” on which economists do not believe anybody can
get utility from what we on Earth would call entertainment items—things
that would be consumed and would not leave anything tangible behind. He
imagines a scene in which somebody is arguing with the Nonhollywood
economists as to why people would spend $8 to go to the movies. The
Nonhollywood economists argue:
“But the alleged ‘preference’ is ‘unstable.’”
It was often pointed out, and backed up by research, that this
alleged preference for seeing movies is highly sensitive, and
therefore not a real preference. While it is true that some people
like going to the movie, it varies a great deal. It depends on mood,
time of day, etc. Indeed, while behavioral researchers claim to
have evidence of people willing to pay for movies, a great deal of
experimental evidence by economic experimentalists show that
this taste goes away under only slightly different conditions.
Moreover, when the experiment was done properly—in the way
economic experimentalists understood how to do experiments—the
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useful;44 thus, when economists are presented evidence that
something they use in their models is not true, they have a
ready answer.45 And in some set of cases, the assumption is
indeed useful—because it is true enough.46
But the
assumption is maintained even when it is not useful;
economics is loath to cede its elegant parsimony. One
obvious example is advertising. I argue in the next Section
that economists’ arguments against the overwhelmingly held
view and intuition that advertising is principally intended to
affect preferences are unsuccessful.
Economists can sustain their use of, if not belief in, the
assumption of fixed preferences because they typically focus
on preferences for particular tangible or intangible things
(e.g., a Ford Mustang or a trip to Bali)47 from obvious choicetaste for movies nearly completely went away. Evidence from wellrun economic experiments shows that this alleged taste for movies
is highly ephemeral.
“But evidence shows people learn they don’t like movies. . . .”
While a few psychologists have argued that they have evidence
that people seem to like movies, these experiments are run under
novel conditions, and don’t allow learning. Indeed, the standard in
psychology experiments was to only ask people to see a movie
once. Hence, you were told, we do not learn whether this behavior
represents a robust preference. But experiments showed that,
while a person might pay $8 to see the movie once, maybe twice, if
you keep asking him for $8 to see the movie, eventually stops
paying. Clearly he learns he doesn’t want to see the movie! Once
play “converges” to “equilibrium” behavior by subjects, we see no
genuine preference for movies . . . .
Rabin, supra note 37, at 680–83.
43
. See generally Ariely, Coherent Arbitrariness, supra note 3; Slovic,
supra note 1.
44
. One early and well-known articulation of this position is in Milton
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 9–16 (1935).
45
. See id.
46
. See McDonnell, supra note 2, at 2. Note, though, that McDonnell
probably thinks there are more cases where preferences can safely be
assumed to be fixed than I do.
47
. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 58–59
(2d ed. 1992). Consider such concepts as “revealed preferences,”
“willingness to pay,” “deadweight losses,” and “consumer surplus.” All
these come into play paradigmatically and most readily with respect to
particular tangible items. See also note 27 supra, and the following quote,
in which Gary Becker describes and critiques the standard assumptions of
the rational choice model.
The economist’s normal approach to analyzing consumption and
leisure choices assumes that individuals maximize utility with
preferences that depend at any moment only on the goods and
services they consume at that time. These preferences are
assumed to be independent of both past and future consumption,
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sets (cars, or vacations, within x price range).48 A person
might very well prefer, in a coherent, transitive and stable
way, a Ford Mustang over other cars and over having the
cash the Mustang costs. And economists can always raise
the specter of a familiar and powerful argument from theory,
Dutch booking—if people’s preferences did not have the
economist-attributed characteristics, people could be Dutchbooked so as to lose all their money.49 The argument is part
of the broader class of arbitrage arguments: all riskless
arbitrage opportunities are taken advantage of fully; people
who give away money will be driven from the market. Many
things follow from this argument, including that markets are
efficient and that people in the aggregate are not “dumb.”
The Dutch-booking argument or its more generic arbitrage
analogue is said to sound the death-knell for preferences
that do not conform to the economists’ assumptions—people
who have such preferences can be double-booked, and will
therefore become extinct. Hence the normative position
that even if people do not have preferences that conform to
the economists’ model, they should.
At first blush, the Dutch-booking/arbitrage argument
seems to have considerable intuitive appeal, especially as to
and of the behavior of everyone else. This approach has provided
to be a valuable simplification for addressing many economic
questions, but a large number of choices in all societies depend
very much on past experience and social forces.
Id. See also BECKER, supra note 94, in which Becker explicitly rejects the idea
that preferences are for traditional objects of choice.
48
. In this regard, consider the extent to which economists have used
money gambles to study choice. See Markman & Medin, supra note 20, at
413–14, 427. Interestingly, the money gamble studies provide greater
evidence of the normative position than the positive position.
The
gambles’ expected values are computed arithmetically; some people pay
different amounts for identically valued gambles. Still, a reasonable
conclusion from the gambling work is that these results are exceptional:
people perhaps not only should use expected value computations but in
these cases usually do so.
49
. See generally David Laibson & Leeat Yariv, Safety in Markets: An
Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books (July 9, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/
~lyariv/Papers/DutchBooks.pdf.
Dutch-booking arguments work most
directly when intransitive preferences are at issue. For instance, if person
X prefers A to B, B to C, but C to A, X will pay more for A than B, and more
for B than C, but more for C than A; somebody could engage in a series of
transactions with X where X would be selling C for a particular price, but
repurchasing it for more; with enough of these transactions, X would
eventually go bankrupt. Intransitive preferences are not coherent.
Paradigmatic intransitive preferences are, however, stable and
determinate.
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stability and coherence of preferences. If Jones likes the
Grateful Dead twice as much as he likes Jefferson Airplane
on Monday, and the reverse on Tuesday, it is easy to see
how somebody trading with Jones could soon make Jones
penniless. But this seems like, in Fred Schauer’s memorable
phrase, an “argument from a weird case.”50 In the non-weird
everyday cases, there is a common sense answer to the
Dutch-booking/arbitrage type of argument.51 Even if Jones
does have these preferences, he will probably catch on after
one or two exchanges.52 (Or else the “irrational” preference
is not quite what it seems to be.53 I may be willing to buy
ten lottery tickets; it does not follow that I’d buy 10 million
lottery tickets.54 I may simply have a budget for “irrational”
expenditures55 that’s well within what I can afford to lose.)
50

. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 421–23
(1985). Schauer is actually rather sympathetic to such arguments, arguing
in effect that life is often weird; still, he thinks that even slightly weird
cases ought not to unduly inform rule-making or law-making.
See
generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
883 (2006).
51
. See generally Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 50.
52
. Richard Warner also makes this point, in Richard Warner,
Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1705, 1738–39 (1995). Laibson & Yariv, supra note 49, also make a point
to this effect: “that Dutch Book arguments cannot be used to rule out
dynamically inconsistent preferences and naive beliefs.” Id. at abstract.
Rabin, supra note 37, makes not only this point, but also a broader point
about the use of dutch-book/arbitrage arguments against “irrational”
choices generally. Returning to Nonhollywood, the economists are arguing
again about preferences for movie-going. They argue:
Indeed, if there were people who went around giving $8 for nothing
in return, they would quickly be driven from the market, so that
their behavior would not matter: “But those behaving like this will
be driven from the market!”
An audience member assured you that somebody willing to pay $8
for a movie could be “Dutch-booked”: If people paid $8 just to sit in
front of a screen, then somebody could make money off of them!
When you respond that, yes, somebody could and is making money
off of those willing to pay the $8, another audience member
assures you that if people were really willing to pay $8 for nothing
in return, they would in short order be bilked of all their money by
an arbitrageur. When you shyly suggest that a consumer’s
willingness sometimes to give some of his money to see a movie
doesn’t mean he’ll pay infinite amounts to anybody who offers
movies, or suggest it might be costly to provide these movies, you
get scoffed at for being ad hoc, changing your story, and being
very loose about what preferences you were proposing.
Id. at 682.
53
. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 683.
54
. See id.
55
. Or I am paying for the “dream” the lottery promises in its ad
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Being amenable to being Dutch-booked does not seem like
an all-or-nothing proposition.56 The irrationality, such as it is,
is self-limiting. And in any event, standard economic theory
suggests that not all Dutch-booking/arbitrage opportunities
will be fully exploited: there must be, as Grossman and
Stiglitz memorably argued, an efficient amount of
inefficiency to make the business of looking for such
opportunities worthwhile.57
Furthermore, what may seem like an unstable
preference may in fact be a stable preference—but not for a
traditional object of choice. The rational choice theory does
not readily accommodate higher level preferences. Three
examples: (1) Jones wants to be stylish. She may conclude
that she wants bell bottom pants and is willing to pay $y for
them after she sees stylish women wearing the pants. But
she may later determine that bell bottoms are out of style,
at which point she may become unwilling to wear bell
bottoms, much less pay for them.58 (2) Jones prefers and
chooses Raisin Bran on Monday and Quaker Oatmeal on
Tuesday. Maybe his higher level preference is for variety
—“try different cereals every once in a while”—or frugality
—“I’ll buy whatever is on sale”—or time-efficient decisionmaking—“I’ll buy whatever is at the front of the store so I
spend the least time shopping.” (3) Richard prefers Roederer
champagne to Bollinger champagne. I gave Richard one
bottle of each champagne. He drank the Bollinger first, on
Labor Day, saving the Roederer. This best accommodated
his higher level preference for the best celebratory occasions
possible; he wanted to save the Roederer for some more
celebratory day than Labor Day.
campaign, “buy a ticket, buy a dream.”
56
. See Rieskamp et al., supra note 3, at 653 (making related
arguments, and characterizing the money-pump/Dutch-book argument in
this context as a “logical bogeyman”). Reiskamp et al.’s arguments
“demonstrate how irrational behavior in principle could occur, but . . . do
not show that irrational behavior in fact occurs.” Id. The authors cite Lola
Lopes, When Time is Of the Essence: Averaging, Aspiration and the Short
Run, 65 ORG. BEHAV & HUM. DECISION PROC . 179, 187 (2006) for the “logical
bogeyman” phrase.
57
. Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). Surely, the
wackier and more self-destructive the preference, the less certain the
arbitrage opportunity to exploit it is. Rather than picking up the proverbial
$20 on the floor, the opportunity would be tantamount to reaching far into
a smelly grate to get something that, from a distance, looked like it might
be a coin.
58
. See Hill, Beyond Mistakes, supra note 16, at 574.
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Of course, there are “unstable” preferences that
theoretically should not be problematic to standard theory
because they involve new information. Jones buys the
oatmeal on Tuesday after a visit to his doctor reveals he has
high cholesterol; Jones buys the oatmeal on Tuesday
because he finds out that the Raisin Bran factory emitted
pollutants into a stream and he cares a great deal about the
environment.59 However, these preferences certainly violate
stability, given that stability requires (presumably counter to
everybody’s intuition and in accord with nobody’s real
normative views) that preferences stay stable over time.
“Unstable” preferences of these sorts are surely
common, but they scarcely seem amenable to being Dutchbooked. This is so for many reasons, including that the shifts
at issue are hard to predict, and even harder to exploit in
any
way
that
somebody
would
find
worthwhile.
Considerable evidence exists that preferences work this way;
my description at least has realism on its side. Without the
Dutch-booking argument, it is hard to make a normative
argument that preferences should not work this way. 60
What about invariance? It is important to distinguish
between two types of cases. The first is the mistake type of
case frequently discussed in the behavioral law and
economics literature, 61 which is amenable to the same sort
of analysis made above with respect to stability and
coherence. The preferences at issue here do vary by mode
of elicitation, but only because of a straightforward defect in
reasoning. Recall the case of Smith, who has a different
preference for a particular treatment based on whether it is
described as having an 80% success rate or a 20% failure
rate. Professionals, too, such as sophisticated investors,
sometimes use defective reasoning. 62
59

. On preferences for processes, see generally Douglas Kysar,
Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526 (2004).
60
. See, more generally, Chapman’s critique of rational choice as a
normative ideal, in Chapman, supra note 13, at 1170–71.
I echo
Chapman’s critique in Hill, supra note 16, at 590.
61
. See generally Hill supra note 16 (arguing that behavioral law and
economics frequently takes as its motivating force and starting point
“mistakes” (such as hindsight bias, over/underestimation of remote
probabilities, salience effects and so on)).
62
. See, e.g., Guillermo Baquero & Marno Verbeek, Do Sophisticated
Investors Believe in the Law of Small Numbers? 5 (ERIM Report Series,
Working Paper Reference No. ERS-2006-033-F&A), available at
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917460 (“Our results
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But many cases do not involve mistakes;63 rather, they
involve situations in which people form their preferences
based on how they come to understand the choice they are
making, when many different constructions are possible and
warranted by the underlying facts.64 The choice made at a
particular time is context-specific. In a different context, the
choice may be different. Just as I argued with many types of
instability, there is considerable evidence that preferences
do work this way, and it is not clear why as a normative
matter such preferences should be undesirable.65 Classic
examples from the experimental literature include situations
in which, as between a fancy pen and money, many people
prefer the money, but when a third option, a cheap pen, is
presented, many more people prefer the expensive pen.66
indicate that the length of the streak of a hedge fund manager has a
statistically and economically significant impact on flows, beyond what is
justified by expected future performance of the fund, suggesting that
investors overinfer the likelihood of performance persistence.”).
63
. I discuss in Hill, supra note 16, how behavioral law and economics’
focus on mistakes disserves the goal of making law and economics more
realistic.
64
. The two types of cases are quite different. The mistake cases lead
to a different (and ultimately more limited and tractable) research agenda
than cases that do not constitute mistakes. The mistakes agenda is
presumably to educate people not to make mistakes or not act on them, or
limit the damage if they do act on them, or something of the sort. The
framing/elicitation agenda is much more open ended.
65
. But how do we determine what is desirable in a world where
preferences are constructed? I consider this issue at greater length in the
Conclusion.
66
. See Chapman, supra note 13, at 1177 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE
OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971)); Shafir et al., supra note
20; see also Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 11, at 222
(making a similar point). There is considerable scholarship on preference
instability; different work describes different types of instability, and gives
different explanations. See, e.g., On Amir & Jonathan Levav, Choice
Construction versus Preference Construction: The Instability of Preferences
Learned in Context (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928984.
Preference consistency implies that people have learned their
willingness to trade off attributes. We argue that this is not
necessarily the case. Instead, we show that when preferences are
learned in context (e.g., through repeated choices made from a
trinary choice set that includes an asymmetrically dominated
decoy), people learn a context-specific choice heuristic (e.g.,
always choose the asymmetrically dominating option), which leads
to less consistent preferences across contexts. In contrast,
repeated choices from sets containing only two options impel
people to learn their subjective attribute weights, yielding
preferences that are consistent across contexts. The difference
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There are many psycholog-ical accounts of why preferences
might work this way: a person is looking for a basis to make
a decision, and finds such a basis in a comparison of
alignable attributes, 67 for instance. Indeed, especially for a
relatively inconsequential decision, a set of rough-and-ready
decision rules may be more useful than a specific rank
ordering, preserving cognitive resources.
In the pen
example, the rules could be, respectively: the default to
prefer money over something with roughly equivalent value;
next, where there are three choices, if there are two roughly
equivalent choices and there is a third choice that is more
clearly inferior to one of the equivalent choices (the cheap
pen), pick the clearly superior choice.68 .
Another example involves competing higher-order
values. Imagine that Jones is both frugal and an
environmentalist. Jones is at a store, choosing between
cheap sneakers and more expensive ones certified as being
made by a manufacturer who does not pollute. If Jones is
wearing his “frugal” hat—say, he just splurged, or he just
talked to his spendthrift relative- he may be inclined to pick
the cheaper option. If he is wearing his “environmentalist”
hat—perhaps he spent the preceding evening with his
environmentalist friends, or he just passed a landfill—he may
be inclined to pick the more environmentally friendly option,
notwithstanding that it is more expensive.
Jones’s preference- and choice- therefore might be
different depending on when he makes it; the subject in the
pen experiment’s preference and choice is different
between choice construction and preference construction is of
importance to marketing managers because repeat purchase is
typically interpreted as a signal of customer preference. We show
that this “preference” might just be a learned solution to the choice
problem, and that as soon as the competitive context changes
(even in a normatively meaningless way), so will consumers’
“preferences.”
Id. at 2; see also Dan Simon et al., Construction of Preferences by
Constraint Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 331, 331 (2004) (“over the course of
decision making . . . preferences shifted to cohere with the choice
[made]”).
67
. On alignable attributes, see Markman & Medin, supra note 20.
68
. Indeed, when I was going to college, it was trendy for a few months
for friends I knew to appoint “random decision makers” to come up with
and apply, principles in daily activities. Some of the principles made some
surface sense (get the cheaper one) and some were more random (do the
thing that is first in the alphabet, or is to the physical left). The rationale
was that extensive deliberation as to everything probably does not pay off,
and that a mechanical formula was a good way to streamline the process.
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depending on what else he’s choosing from. That this is so,
and that this is rational, is well explained by philosopher
David Wiggins:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning
even as well as mathematical logic recapitulates or reconstructs
the actual experience of conducting or exploring deductive
argument, can treat the concerns which an agent brings to any
situation as forming a closed, complete, consistent system. For it
is of the essence of these concerns to make competing and
inconsistent claims. (This is a mark not of irrationality but of
rationality in the face of the plurality of ends and the plurality of
human goods.) The weight of these concerns is not necessarily
fixed in advance. Nor need the concerns be hierarchically ordered.
Indeed, a man’s reflection on a new situation that confronts him
may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously existed, and
bring a change in his evolving conception of the point . . . or the
several or many points, of living or acting.69

What about preferences that are indeterminate? There
are two possibilities.
Perhaps the preference was
indeterminate before it was elicited, but became
determinate and stable thereafter. Alternatively, perhaps
the preference was elicited and then became unstable.
Indeterminacy by itself is problematic for the neoclassical
position insofar as it violates the completeness axiom, which
provides that people can rank-order all their preferences.
They “consult a free-standing preference menu” existing
“before the time of decision and choice.”70
Again,
preferences that were indeterminate before they were
elicited but, once elicited, were stable seem both to exist as
a descriptive matter and to be normatively unobjectionable.
Why should we know what we want before we need to make
a choice? So long as the preference becomes determinate
once elicited, Dutch-booking arguments are not available.
Smith may decide that she wants a dog and is willing to pay
$x for it after a dog-loving friend takes her on an energetic
walk with the friend’s dog in a city where Smith has just
moved. It could have been otherwise. If Smith had just
joined a gym before taking the walk, she might have decided
that she didn’t have time or need for extra exercise; if she
hadn’t moved to the new city, she would not have taken the
walk and discovered her liking for dogs.
My recent purchase of a digital camera provides another
69

. David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 221, 223 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed. 1980).
70
. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 11, at 2637, 2652;
see also Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 32.
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example. When I started the process, I had very little idea
which features mattered to me. At a certain point, after
inquiries that were not random but were scarcely systematic
(that is, some number of web searches, but no metasearches to determine which web sources were particularly
reliable), I stopped looking and bought the camera that
seemed best based on the criteria I had thus far formulated,
even though I knew I did not have full information.71 My
trajectory was path dependent: my choice might have been
otherwise had my searches yielded different information in a
different order.72
But what if the preference, once elicited, is not
determinate, but rather, is unstable or variant to context?
The analysis is the same as set forth above: many (most?)
instances of seeming instability or seeming variance are
hard to characterize as either unlikely or normatively
undesirable.
Where are we left? First, the obvious: the rational choice
model, in which preferences are fixed, is on shaky ground,
both descriptively and normatively.
Dutch booking
arguments will not work for the bulk of cases. Indeed, there
are perfectly sensible accounts one can give of preferences
that deviate from the model. Second, there is no reason to
suppose a rational person would generally follow the axioms
of the rational choice model. In a subset of cases, notably
the mistake cases, it is fair to describe the deviation from
71

. In other words, I satisficed rather than maximized. The terminology
of satisficing vs. maximizing is Herbert Simon’s. Barry Schwartz’s recent
book The Paradox of Choice makes much of it, arguing persuasively for the
benefits of satisficing and the costs of maximizing. BARRY SCHWARTZ, PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004). Note that this type of account does very
little violence to the remainder of the traditional economic model. Here,
satisficing means stopping further inquiries when their cost exceeds their
benefit. That being said, I have elsewhere argued that the traditional model
seems far more determinate in this regard than it is. The point at which
costs exceed benefits is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in many
cases; assessing costs or benefits of acquiring or verifying information is
scarcely straightforward or mechanical. How do we know how much
benefit acquiring particular information will offer? How much it will cost?
See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do As
Much With Fewer Words, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 939 n.26 (2004). This
criticism is different but complementary.
72
. It is possible I might change my mind later, if I acquire different
information that tells me I incorrectly valued characteristics of the camera
(or, of course, my preferences themselves change); in this case, the
analysis about indeterminate preferences that become variant or unstable
would apply.
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the model as irrational. Even then, however, the irrationality
is probably self-limiting. A person may not make ideal
choices—she may prefer the treatment with the 80% cure
rate to the (identical) treatment with the 20% failure rate.
But she might understand that a 65% cure rate is worse than
a 25% failure rate.
In other supposed deviations from the rational choice
axioms, people may be making choices in some manner
other than by consulting an invariant complete rank
ordering. What might people have instead of invariant
complete rank orderings? In Section 4, I hypothesize that
they have ways of making choices: they construct
narratives, using evaluative criteria against a backdrop of
wants, desires and inclinations, some of which they rank and
some of which they do not. Their wants, desires and
inclinations are for both traditional objects of choice and
higher order values and desires, as previously formulated
and as constructed and elicited in the choice-making
process. And their methodology, as I hypothesize it to be,
economizes on cognitive resources, making a strong case
that it is rational.

3. THE CASE OF ADVERTISING
Advertising presents a puzzle for economists: if
preferences exist to be discovered and revealed, what are
advertisers doing? If there were a context, one might think,
in which the fixed preferences assumption should be
abandoned as not true enough to be useful, it is as to
advertising. But neoclassical economists nevertheless try to
explain advertising while holding onto their assumption.
And in some cases, they can.
Sometimes the
economists answer the question “what are advertisers
doing?” by saying “advertisers are providing information.” I
once lived in a very noisy apartment at a busy intersection in
New York. The windows were old; garbage trucks came by
at all hours; and a “singer” across the street sang very
badly, at all hours, in hopes that people would pay for his
silence. I heard an ad on the radio: “are you bothered by
lots of street noise? Buy our white noise machine that blocks
out street noise.” The ad was from a reputable store; I
immediately called and placed my order.
But, as economists acknowledge, much advertising is not
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informative,73 at least about the products or services being
advertised. Certainly, the explosive growth of TiVo, which
permits people to block advertisements, shows that people
will pay to avoid advertising, something they presumably
wouldn’t be so ready to do if they were getting information
they valued.74
What do economists say about such
advertisements?75 The classic signaling story is one
possibility. Providers of goods and services are signaling
their confidence in their products or services by using highpriced celebrities or making other conspicuous expenditures
that will be worthless if their products or services are not of
good quality.76 But why not simply publicize how much an
73

. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of
Advertising as a Good or Bad, 108 Q. J. ECON. 941 passim (1993). But
indirect provision of information through a chain of inferences may indeed
be part of what is at work in some instances, as discussed in note 76, infra.
74
. People do not avoid all advertisements. Indeed, there are awards
for
the
best
ads.
See
About
the
CLIO
Awards,
http://www.clioawards.com/about (last visited Apr. 25, 2008). Especially
good advertisements are viewed voluntarily on the Internet. But people
would still avoid most advertisements if they could. A recent example of
efforts along these lines is the pop-up blocker.
75
. Interestingly, many economists are hostile to advertising, but, of
course, not on account of commercialism or amorality.
Among the
economists’ objections are that advertising might help monopolists raise
barriers to entry for potential competitors, or that it might simply shift
demand from one product to another without an aggregate increase in
utility. See Jeffry M. Netter, Excessive Advertising: An Empirical Analysis,
30 J. INDUS. ECON. 361 passim (1982). Interestingly, notwithstanding the
intuitive force of the second claim, it’s a difficult one for economists to
flesh out and argue properly. By what mechanism would demand shift?
How can Coke persuade people who “prefer” Pepsi to buy Coke instead? If
people’s preferences are fixed, how could advertising make a difference?
For an interesting theory as to how advertising might be economically
efficient, see Becker & Murphy, supra note 73. Becker and Murphy
characterize “advertisements as one of the goods that enter the fixed
preferences of consumers.” They argue that advertisements do not change
tastes, but are instead complements to the goods being advertised. Id. at
942.. “There is no reason to claim that advertisements change tastes just
because they affect the demand for other goods.” Id.
76
. The extreme but paradigmatic case is one in which the celebrity is
simply a disguised price tag. The example often given is the ads for
pantyhose featuring sports star Joe Namath. But this is a bad example: why
should Joe not know what kind of pantyhose he would like to see on a
woman? And why should women not care a great deal about his opinion on
this subject? And presumably Sam Waterston advertising TD Waterhouse is
implicitly representing that he has investigated the company and they are
not fly-by-nights. More generally, another, complementary type of indirect
information provision may also be occurring in some types of celebrity
advertising: people may infer that a celebrity would not have participated
in the advertising if she did not believe the product was good, and that her
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advertising campaign costs? Wouldn’t doing so signal
confidence more directly and enable comparisons of relative
confidence among manufacturers?77
None of this is to say that advertisements do not signal
confidence in what is being advertised: Presumably, most
manufacturers believe in their products and expend
significant resources in making and promoting them. And
they may reason that even if people make efforts via TiVo
and other means to avoid advertisements, negative
inferences might be drawn from their not advertising when
their competitors are doing so.78 Rather, it is to say that they
must also be doing something else, and importantly so.
Confidence by itself is not sufficient for business success;79 it
may not even be necessary, as suggested by the word-ofbelief counts for something, especially if she is considered to have
knowledge relevant to the product or to be circumspect about lending her
name to advertising campaigns. This account works nicely within the
neoclassical paradigm. However, it only applies to a subset of what is
already a subset of advertisements, celebrity advertisements.
More
significantly, the mechanism it postulates also ultimately relies on the
construction of preferences. Consider in this regard how we determine
whose knowledge counts, and who is considered authoritative.
One pure signaling example may be the use of William Shatner in
advertisements—at this point, the mechanism seems to be the equivalent
of a catchy tune rather than any indirect provision of information other
than the company believes in the product enough to bother finding and
paying Mr. Shatner. See Nina M. Lentini, For Some Aging Actors, SelfMockery Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at C11 (“It is ‘difficult to make a
compelling, logical, rational argument for these products’ superiority over
their rivals,’ Mr. Martin [a psychology professor] said, so advertisers need
to ‘evoke positive associations with the product in the minds of the viewers
without encouraging them to think too much about it.’”). See also GARY S.
BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS 4 (2000), discussing a different but
perhaps related mechanism. (“Advertising suggesting that Michael Jordan
eats a particular breakfast cereal may induce many children and adults to
eat this cereal so that they can vicariously be ‘closer’ to this superb former
basketball player.”).
77
. Becker & Murphy make essentially this point.
See Becker &
Murphy, supra note 73, at 944. One answer within the neoclassical
framework for the Waterston and Namath types of ads is that these ads
may provide the best combination of two types of information: the
information about the product or service inferred from the celebrity’s
presumed knowledge or circumspection, and the information about the
manufacturer’s confidence in the product, given that it’s known that the
celebrity’s services do not come cheaply.
78
. See C. Robert Clark & Ig Horstmann, Advertising and Coordination
in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 377,
380 (2005).
79
. I discuss this point in Claire A. Hill, Law and Economics in the
Personal Sphere, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 219, 246–247 (2004).
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mouth re-popularization of Hush Puppies shoes, described by
Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point.80
Another argument available to economists is that
advertisements can allow somebody to coordinate her
behavior with others’ behavior by conveying information
about what others might do.81 If Sarah Jessica Parker is a
cool celebrity at time T and she appears in an ad for the
Gap, I may conclude that many people I know will also wear
Gap clothes, and therefore purchase the clothes.
The
coordination theory is also right in many cases but is
incomplete; it cannot explain why some attempts at
coordination succeed while others do not.82
This
80

. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 3–5 (2000).
81
. See generally Clark & Horstmann, supra note 78, at 394–95
(arguing that advertising for products that have no obvious quality
differentiation can be explained in part by the observation that “consumers
care how many others also consume a given product”); C. Robert Clark & Ig
Horstmann, Celebrity Endorsements (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
82
. Clark & Hortsmann, supra note 78, addresses this question, but
only partially.
Why do some firms use celebrity endorsements in their ad
campaigns and others do not and what are the circumstances
under which celebrities are likely to be observed? In markets in
which advertising coordinates consumer purchases, we find that
celebrity endorsements are more likely chosen for products that
have either i) high price-cost margins, ii) large potential customer
pools or iii) the need to coordinate across diverse sets of
customers. We also find that “successful” celebrity endorsements
are ones that enhance brand recall while “unsuccessful”
endorsements are ones that enhance consumer perceptions of the
product. We also find an explanation for the use of “fictional”
celebrities like Joe Camel.
Id.
They cannot, and do not purport to, explain why ads with celebrity A might
be successful whereas others with celebrity B might not be. See also
Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Believe the Hype: Solving Coordination Problems
with Television Advertising (Jan. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology), available at
http://www. shwe.net/michael/papers.html (arguing for a coordination
account of advertising on popular programs); Tuvana Pastine & Ivan
Pastine, Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: The Role
of Advertising and Product Quality, 2005 CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER 5152
(providing a coordination explanation “for the empirical observation that in
some markets high quality is associated with lower levels of advertising”).
The main result is that advertisers of “coordination problem” or
“social” goods, in our sample computers, beer, pizza, and wine,
tend to advertise on more popular shows and are willing to spend
significantly more per viewer than advertisers of other products
such as batteries, deodorant, and breakfast cereal. The explanation
offered here is that for technological reasons in the case of
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incompleteness points to a difficulty in accommodating into
a neo-classical economics framework the mechanism by
which ads might coordinate.
Contrast coordination accounts used as explanations for
law.83 The classic example is traffic signals: it does not
matter which side of the street people drive on so long as
they all drive on the same side. As Richard McAdams
explains,
[L]egal expression can . . . provide a focal point for coordinating
individual action. Because the “mentioned” solution tends to be the
most salient, when the legal rule is sufficiently publicized, it
provides salience to one kind of behavior. Law can thereby work
expressively even if people do not believe they have a moral
obligation to obey it.84

McAdams’s explanation shows precisely how the
economists’ coordination account of advertising is lacking.
The key is that law is automatically well-situated to be focal.
Advertisements are not.85 Law has a built-in gravitas, and is
often salient in a way other communications cannot readily
be.
It also has a primacy that is antithetical to
advertisement: to overstate the case a bit, there is one law,
whereas there are many products in competition with one
another.
Furthermore, from an individual’s perspective,
there may be an economy of scope between the expressive
and classic incentive-based function of law. Finally, people
may simply believe that law generally gets it right as to what
things ought to be prohibited; again, the coordination may
piggyback on the other reasons to obey law. 86 Law inherits a
position with built-in importance. A particular advertisement
does not, and it may or may not succeed in acquiring such a
position.87
If advertising is not automatically well situated to be
focal, how does it help coordinate behavior? The commonsense answer—that in some circumstances it comes to be
focal—relies on the construction of preferences.
When
seeing Sarah Jessica Parker looking stylish with Gap clothing,
enough people may or may not come to believe that the
clothes are cool, in the mystical, as yet badly understood
computers and social reasons in the case of beer, pizza, and wine,
a person’s preference for these goods increases in the number of
other people who buy that good. When a consumer sees a brand
advertised on a popular show, she not only learns about the brand,
she learns that many other people know about it also. Hence
advertisers of social goods are willing to pay a premium for slots on
popular shows.
Chew, supra, at 1–2.
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and difficult to predict, process by which that status is
conferred on things, people, ideas, lifestyles, and so on.
They may come to think others will find the clothes cool as
well. The collective belief that something is cool (or that
many people find it so) is what makes it so, and thus, often,
what makes it become a preference. It is not as though the
Gap’s clothes are stylish in some factual sense, or were
stylish independent of or prior to being depicted and then
thought of as such. The advertising campaigns associating
the clothes with coolness are probably a necessary part of
this process,88 but are scarcely sufficient; some advertising
campaigns fail miserably.
Advertising can indeed
coordinate, but has no built-in or assured ability to do so. To
be sure, the neoclassical position is not challenged just
because an explanation it proposes relies on coordination
and cannot explain why people would coordinate around a
particular thing. Certainly, green lights are to be explained
as coordination, even though it is not clear why everyone
would coordinate around them. The difficulty is in the basis
for the remainder of the explanation—in this case: a
83

. See Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (“[L]aw provides a focal point around which
individuals can coordinate their behavior. When individuals have a common
interest in coordinating, as frequently occurs, a legal rule may guide
behavior merely by influencing expectations about how others will
behave.”).
84
. Id. at 1666.
85
. McAdams notes:
[T]here are three reasons to suppose that legal expression can
sometimes facilitate coordination when other third-party
communication cannot. The publicity frequently accorded law
means it is more likely to create the expectations necessary for
coordination. Further, various features of law create a uniqueness
to legal expression that frequently causes its message to “stand
out” against the background of public discourse. Finally, because
the publicity and uniqueness of law gives government officials the
ability to create a focal point and influence behavior, these officials
may develop a reputation for correctly “predicting” future
behavior. The claim is not that law is invariably better than private
expression at facilitating coordination, but only that it often is.
Id. at 1668.
86
. Id. at 1668 – 1672.
87
. Might advertising attempt to be focal more often than law does?
Even if it does, the analysis stays the same. One advertiser is competing
against others; the law has no comparable competition.
88
. That being said, some things become trendy without purposive
effort by any of the obvious candidates.
See supra note 80 and
accompanying text (noting the Hush Puppies example given by Malcolm
Gladwell).
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“creation,” or “construction,” of what is cool, developed as a
(probably unstable) instantiation of a higher order
preference.89
Indeed, non-informative advertising often links the
products or services advertised to generally-held higherorder preferences, supplying the narrative needed to make
the link. One memorable shampoo commercial’s pitch was
that using the advertised shampoo would be, to express the
matter delicately, an ecstatic experience. The advertisers
presumably hope that people buying the shampoo will, at
least facetiously, characterize the experience of using it, as
being within the category “ecstatic experiences” rather than
just among “cleaning and hygiene promoting experiences.”
There may be an identity adjunct as well. A person might
want to be the sort of person who chose her shampoo
because of the pitch at issue—because she wanted to think
of herself, or depict herself to others, as somebody who
valued ecstatic experiences.
Indeed, in examples involving trends, fashion and the
like, the preferences are apt to be higher order: status,
glamour, healthy lifestyle and so on. Identity considerations
—how a person does, and wants to, view herself—are often
part and parcel of higher order preferences. A person may
want to think of herself as being stylish, and as informing
herself about what it takes to be stylish. (It could be
otherwise. Academics are overrepresented among people
who not only do not care about style, but also take pride in
not caring about it.)
I have thus far argued that advertising may work by
appealing to pre-existing higher-order preferences—
convincing people that a particular product will promote a
healthy lifestyle, or will give them particular sorts of
89

. Any sensible construction of the neoclassical view does have to
allow for the existence of fads. See, e.g., BECKER & MURPHY, supra note 76 at
3. (“[E]ndless examples attest to the great impact of culture, norms and
social structure. Popular restaurants and books are determined in good
part by which is considered ‘in’. . . .”). Fads will necessarily lead to
violations of the traditional axioms if the objects of the fads, the so-called
traditional objects of choice, are what are regarded as preferences;
consider in this regard Becker’s statement that preferences are not for
traditional objects of choice, quoted in note 94, infra and discussed in note
47, supra, and accompanying text. If the neoclassical view can allow that
the preference can be higher-order (a preference to be fashionable, for
instance) it will not be so easily violated. But I argue in Section 5 that
there are many instantiations for even one higher-order preference, and
many such preferences also can conflict.
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experiences different than what they might have supposed.
Whether advertising really seeks to convince people these
things are literally true, as opposed to making them
associate the product with the desired category, is beyond
the scope of this article.
In the succeeding Section, I
consider the mechanism by which people might become
convinced—the narrative that people construct.

4. HOW ARE PREFERENCES CONSTRUCTED? AN
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT
At this juncture, it is appropriate to turn to a basic
question: What is a preference?
Merriam Webster,
unhelpfully, defines a preference as “one that is preferred.”
The definition of “preferred” leads, equally unhelpfully, to
another definition: “to like better or best.”90 The literature
often treats as synonymous preference and choice: one
chooses what one prefers. For economists, preferences are
either choices (as to which the preference is revealed by
making the choice) or hypothetical choices one would
make.91
But on further reflection, this view of preferences is
difficult to maintain.
As the examples in the previous
90

. MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/preferred.
91
. The Economist Magazine’s on-line dictionary of economics terms
defines preference as “[w]hat consumers want. See Revealed Preference.”
Economics
A-Z,
ECONOMIST.COM,
http://www.economist.com/research/
Economics/alphabetic.cfm? letter=P#preference.
The definition of
Revealed Preference contains the following joke: “‘two economists see a
Ferrari. ‘I want one of those,’ says the first. “Obviously not,’ replies the
other.’” This demonstrates the theory that what a person wants is revealed
not by what she says but by she does. Economics A-Z, ECONOMIST.COM, http://
www.economist.
com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?
term=revealedpreference#revealedpreference. But clearly a person can
have a preference in the absence of having to make a choice, and can
have to make a choice not completely in accord with her preferences. As
Cass Sunstein puts it,
If preferences are reducible to choices, we can dispense with the
idea of preferences entirely. But if we do this, much of the
explanatory value of expected utility and rational choice theory will
be lost. . . . [I]t will be necessary to give up on the notion of an
underlying causal relationship between choices and internal mental
states. An important goal of rational choice theory has been to
help show how choices connect with preferences, defined
independently of choices.
Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 11, at 222. Some might
argue that rational choice theorists have abandoned this goal; in my view,
if they have, doing so was a mistake.
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Section indicate, people have many preferences—when a
choice is called for, they may or may not choose what they
“prefer.” I prefer chocolate over vanilla. I prefer being fit to
being unfit. If I choose going to the gym over chocolate,
what does this say about the fact that I have quite a strong
preference for chocolate over many other things? And what
if I choose going to the gym on one occasion and on another
occasion, I choose the chocolate?92 And what if I have a rule
that I will not have chocolate more than twice a month, and
the third time in a month that I’m offered chocolate (or am
offered a set of choices that includes chocolate) I decline the
chocolate because of my rule? Preferences, then, are rank
orderings, but almost certainly not complete or invariant
rank orderings; they are relevant to choice but do not
determine choice.93 I prefer oysters to clams and mussels.
Where does Mozart fit into this ordering? Do I like Mozart
more or less than mussels? What if I have $20 to spend and I
can either buy oysters, clams, mussels, or a CD of Mozart?
What is the relationship between preferences and choices?
Choices are preferences all things considered. Moreover, one
can have a preference for something that one could not
feasibly make a particular choice for—something that has
many disparate realizations—say, health, happiness, or a
relaxing vacation. These are higher order preferences.
Preferences with less disparate realizations (say, chocolate)
can be considered lower order.94
92

. Whatever else it means, it does not mean I could be Dutch-booked.
. See Bowles, supra note 2, at 78 (“Preferences are reasons for
behavior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their beliefs and
capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation.”). Bowles
also characterizes preferences as “cultural traits, or learned influences on
behavior: liking ice cream, or never lying, or reciprocating dinner
invitations are cultural traits.” Id at 80.
94
. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 14 (2002) (discussing Arrow’s
“far-reaching characterization of preference” as “including a person’s
‘entire system of values, including values about values’”) (quoting KENNETH
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 18 (1963)); see also Bowles, supra
note 2, at 78–79 (“[P]references go considerably beyond tastes, as an
adequate account of individual actions would have to include values or
what Amartya Sen . . . terms commitments and John Harsanyi . . . calls
moral preferences (as distinct from personal preferences).”). Interestingly,
Gary Becker, generally a proponent of orthodox views about preferences,
said:
The preferences that are assumed to be stable do not refer to
market goods and services, like oranges, automobiles, or medical
care, but to underlying objects of choice that are produced by each
household using market goods and services, their own time, and
other inputs. These underlying preferences are defined over
93
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And what of unranked tastes or interests? If the movers
ask where I would like my couch placed, I may think “the
living room or the second bedroom seem good” without
preferring the one to the other. I do have to make a choice,
and so I decide which I prefer. But the initial tastes or views
were not rank-ordered. These are what Donald Davidson
usefully calls “pro-attitudes.”95
The economists’ descriptive take allows them to
hypothesize a comparatively simple relationship between
preferences and choices: preferences are either revealed (by
being chosen) or would be revealed (chosen). I did choose
chocolate over vanilla. Were I to be given a choice between
zinfandel and ice cream, I would take the zinfandel. But a
rejection of their descriptive (and normative) position along
the lines of the previous Section also yields recognition that
the relationship between preferences and choices is far more
complicated.
How do people make choices? In their accounts, Shafir et
al. and Chapman use the term “reasons.”96 My account has a
related albeit broader concept: narrative.97 All reasons are
narratives, but there is more to many narratives. And some
fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual
pleasure, benevolence, or envy, that do not always bear a stable
relation to market goods and services.”
Becker, supra note 2, at 5. Becker is not completely orthodox; consider the
quote above, as well as his statement that his “approach incorporates
experiences and social forces into preferences or tastes.” Becker, supra
note 3, at 4. But Becker’s views have remained true in significant part to
the rational choice paradigm. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker,
De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 77 (1977) (“The
establishment of the proposition that one may usefully treat tastes as
stable over time and similar among people is the central task of this
essay.”). See also BECKER & MURPHY, supra note 76, at 5 (“The analytic
approach relies on the assumptions of utility maximization and equilibrium
in the behavior of groups, which are the traditional foundations of rational
choice analysis and the economic approach to behavior. This book shows
how to incorporate social forces into this approach.”) and, at 8 (“The
approach we take treats the social environment as arguments, along with
goods and services, in a stable extended utility function.”).
95
. Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685,
685–86 (1963), reprinted in ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (Ernest LePore & Brian P.
McLaughlin eds., 1985).
96
. Chapman supra note 13; Shafir et al., supra note 20.
97
. Scholars from many disciplines study narrative. Many, including
some psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists, stress the
importance, if not primacy, of people organizing their worldviews, including
their memories, using narratives. See, e.g., DAN P. MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE
LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELF (1993); Jerome Bruner, Life as
Narrative, 71 SOC. RES. 691 (2004).
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narratives are far from what might be commonly recognized
as reasons. Narrative plays a critical role in various social
sciences. One important function of narrative is to help
people organize their world views and justify their
decisions.98 Of course, my account is not intended to be a
formal, fully-developed theory of preference; rather, it is the
beginning of a process-based model, in which important
determinants of preference construction can be understood,
and a preliminary taxonomy of such determinants can be
articulated.
The way people make choices and form preferences
importantly involves narrative.99 In my account, the critical
determinant of preference construction is narrative
dependence. The simpler the narrative, the less the
preference is narratively dependent. An example captures
the intuition: My narrative about why I like chocolate is
comparatively simple. My narrative about why I wanted to be
a law professor (or, for that matter, write about preferences)
is decidedly more complex. The same can be said about my
preferences regarding which worthy cause I want the
government to devote scarce resources to—or, more
precisely, which ones I am willing to have it devote fewer or
no resources to. I can easily imagine having a trajectory in
which my career or article choices (or sympathy for a
particular worthy cause) were different. It is rather harder to
imagine how I would come not to have liked chocolate.
Indeed, filling out this intuition, more narratively
independent preferences tend to feel unmediated; the
choice may involve a narrative, but the preference may not.
By contrast, for more narratively dependent preferences, the
preference—and the choice—are apt to succeed the
narrative. Again, contrast chocolate with a career decision.
My distinction harkens back to Aristotle, whose concept of
“appetite” has much in common with my term “narratively
independent preferences.”100
98

. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 137–43 (1999)
(discussing the function of explanations and story-telling in decisionmaking).
99
. See generally MCADAMS, supra note 97 (providing a general account
of how we make sense of the world and our experiences by constructing
stories).
100
. Aristotle distinguishes between Appetite (epithumia), ARISTOTLE, DE
ANIMA 414b5–6, Passion (Thumos), ARISTOTLE, POLITICS VII.6.1327b39ff, and
Wish, rational desire (boulesis), ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 435a5–10.
Animals have appetites. Passion and wish require rationality,
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Almost all preferences are constructed: they do not exist
to be discovered or revealed, and they could have been
otherwise. But some are, or at least seem to be, more
constructed than others. Indeed, there is a continuum; at
one end are preferences that seem comparatively
narratively independent, such as biologically hard-wired
preferences, or preferences for ice cream, and on the other
hand, are preferences that seem far more narratively
dependent, such as a choice of career. The more narratively
independent the preference, the more fixed it is; the more
narratively dependent, the more it could have been
otherwise. This is not to say that narratively dependent
preferences are easy to change. To the contrary, narratively
dependent preferences can be quite resistant to change if
the relevant narrative is sufficiently entrenched (that is,
fixed). Consider in this regard the recent work on “cultural
cognition”—“the tendency of individuals to conform their
beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether global
warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty
deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe
or less) to values101 that define their cultural identities.”102 I
have written on an overlapping subject—identity as
perceptual lens.103 Both the work on cultural cognition and
my work discuss one important mechanism by which a
preference—for a particular policy, for instance—remains
entrenched. An individual’s preference is anchored to her
identity; her identity affects the way she takes in data. The
passion because it involves seeing my acts and the acts of others
as justified or unjustified (anger is a desire to return pain for pain
because I see myself as unjustly injured). Wish is desire in accord
with the dictates of right reason.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1111b8-9.
101
. The term “preference” is sometimes defined more inclusively, and
sometimes less inclusively. Sometimes preferences are defined as choices;
some definitions exclude values. I take the approach of Bowles, Sen and
others who define preferences more inclusively to include choices and
values, but go beyond both. Indeed, the definition of preference, and
distinctions between preference and choice, turn out to be critical. See
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102
. The
Cultural
Cognition
Project
Home
Page,
http://research.yale.edu /culturalcognition/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008)
(“The Project . . . has an explicit normative objective: to identify processes
of democratic decision-making by which society can resolve culturally
grounded differences in belief in a manner that is both congenial to
persons of diverse cultural outlooks and consistent with sound public
policymaking.”).
103
. Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 389
(2007).
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way she takes in data thus serves to further entrench her
preference (as well as her identity). Imagine someone
strongly opposed to gun control. She may think of herself as
very peace-loving, pay far more attention to situations where
guns killed innocent people than when people used guns to
defend themselves against crime,104 and hence have her
preference for gun control and her identity as a gun-controlfavoring-peace-loving-person affirmed.105
What can be said about the narratives? In particular,
what determines whether a preference is more or less
narratively independent? Preferences themselves and proattitudes can be lower-order, about tangible things, or
higher-order, about more abstract values and wants. I prefer
Hershey’s chocolate to Godiva chocolate. I also want to lead
a virtuous life, a higher order preference. Narratives tend to
importantly
include
instantiations
of
higher
order
preferences. I want the Hershey’s chocolate in order to lead
a pleasurable life. I want to exercise because it will make me
have a longer life. But of course there is a higher order
preference favoring chocolate as well: the preference to do
things one finds pleasant. If, as in the Woody Allen movie
Sleeper106 as to steak and hot fudge sundaes, it was
discovered that chocolate is far better for health and weight
control than previously thought, the chocolate preference
would presumably win out far more often.
When I am asked whether I want to have society pay $X
to save some forest, I construct my preference using some
sort of narrative, probably relating to my desire to be a good
citizen, or my desire to leave this planet in good condition
for the next generation. Given that my higher order
preference has many disparate realizations, we should not
be surprised to observe considerable instability and
inconsistency when my (narratively quite dependent) lowerorder preference about the forest is elicited. Context and
circumstance dictates which choice one makes when asked
to do so; the choice is made against a backdrop of (probably
conflicting) lower and higher order preferences. Indeed, the
manner in which higher order preferences inform lower order
104

. See generally DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, ET AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 384–85 ( 4th
ed. 2005) (discussing confirmation bias).
105
. See generally Hill, supra note 103; The Cultural Cognition Project,
Mechanisms
of
Cultural
Cognition,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/ content/view/46/89/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2008).
106
. SLEEPER (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1973).
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preferences is exceedingly complex, and pervades
preference construction. It also pervades decision making, in
the most profound ways, as I will discuss later in this Section.
Going to the other end of the continuum, the least
narratively
dependent
preferences
may
be
those
preferences dictated or strongly influenced by biology. How
narratively (in)dependent a preference is affects the extent
to which it could have been, or could be, otherwise. Consider
in this regard Owen Jones’s argument that law will need to
work harder to change behavior that was adaptive in
previous environments.107 On my account, Jones’s view is a
special case of a more general phenomenon. In this regard,
interesting work by Chen, Lakshminarayanan & Santos,
based on experiments they conducted on Capuchin
monkeys, argues that loss aversion, a preference for
avoiding losses, is “innate and evolutionarily ancient.”108 The
extent to which preferences are hardwired or at least of
ancient evolutionary origin may be much greater than many
assume. According to the authors:
While our results are by no means definitive proof that lossaversion is innate in humans, to the degree that they make us
more likely to believe that some amount of this behavior has a
biological component, they may have implications for how we treat
loss-averse tendencies in human behavior.
For example, if these biases are innate, we may be more inclined
to believe that they will persist in both common and novel settings,
will be stable across time and cultures, and may endure even in the
face of large individual costs, ample feedback, or repeated market
disciplining. This would greatly constrain both the potential for
successful policy intervention and the types of remedies available.
In contrast, while a learned, noninnate heuristic may arise in many
(if not all) cultures, we may not expect it to persist in settings in
which it was highly suboptimal or in which market forces strongly
discipline behavior. This would limit the potential scope and scale
for welfare losses and may suggest that policy interventions that
increase feedback or learning may eliminate what losses do
exist.109

When we make a choice, what are we choosing among?
Here, too, the traditional economists are quite wrong. Recall
that the rational choice model posits a complete rank
ordering of all things; the choice set therefore is or could be
107

. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s
Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1141, 1190 (2001).
108
. M. Keith Chen et al., How Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence
from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior, 114 J. POL. ECON. 517, 520 (2006).
109
. Id. at 540.
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all things, and our preferences would not (should not)
deviate. But in fact, what one is choosing among is not at all
straightforward110—and the choice set matters a great deal.
If one does not regard something as being in the choice set,
one might not think to choose it; I discuss in Beyond
Mistakes examples in which the composition of a choice set
could have significant ramifications in areas important to
policy, including affirmative action and cost-benefit
analysis.111 Consider Virginia Postrel’s discussion of a
justification for affirmative action: that people choose among
the “evoked set,” which is necessarily a subset of the full set
and are hence more likely to choose a member of the
evoked set. Referring to an article in the New York Times
giving very short shift to African-American movie stars Will
Smith and Wesley Snipes, she noted that “The evoked set of
‘action stars’ didn’t overlap with the evoked set of ‘black
movie stars.’ There was no racial hostility at work, just the
limits of human minds and the categories they create.
Overcoming those limits is the argument for a certain type of
affirmative action—not quotas or preferences, but an active
effort to select from the full range of possible candidates, not
merely the first evoked set.”112
Returning to more day-to-day examples: Do I put healthclub membership and theater subscription in the same
choice set? I may, if my aim is to choose what to do on
weekend evenings. But, I may not, depending on how I come
to organize and view my choices, which in turn depends on
many factors, including, for instance, advertisements and
the behavior and views of my friends. Indeed, until I wrote
this paper, I never thought to put the two in the same choice
set—but I will probably do so in the future.113 My choice
process here is intractably and profoundly path-dependent
and dependent on mode of elicitation, because it turns on
how I categorize, which itself depends on a path-dependent
trajectory that could have been otherwise. Indeed, many
factors may influence whether the category “what I do on
110

. See Markman et al., supra note 20, at 413–66. I discuss this point in
Hill, supra note 16, at 581.
111
. Hill, supra note 16, at 582–83.
112
. Id. at 582.
113
. Cf. Markman & Medin, supra note 20, at 427 (“People may choose
differently depending on whether they are retrieving potential options
sequentially and accepting or rejecting them immediately rather than
explicitly comparing a set of options. The process of generation and
evaluation may differ substantially from comparative choice processes.”).
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weekend evenings” is meaningful to me, and what belongs
in the category. (Feeding the cat? Bathing? Getting food at
the supermarket? Having the radio on? Having it on to a
particular station?) Factors such as how regularly I do the
activity, how much time it takes, and how much prominence
it has in my assessment of what I have done and what I am
doing are all relevant.
Indeed, what we put in a choice set—what we see
ourselves as choosing among—is part of how we categorize
the world. And we all do pervasively categorize; we need to
categorize in order to make sense of ourselves and our
surroundings. Categorization is implicit in preferences: I have
a preference for things falling within the category of
“chocolate.” I have a preference for activities falling within
the category “activities that will make me healthy.”
Critically, as psychologists have noted and as I discussed at
length in Beyond Mistakes, one’s categories and
categorizations are somewhat malleable. No pre-ordained
group of categories is correct and relevant for everyone.
Moreover, except in rare cases, there are no necessary
and sufficient conditions for any particular category. Rather,
new potential category members are judged by their
perceived similarity to existing category members and the
overarching concept of the category. Can the category of
“things that make me healthy” come to include a long fast
motivated by political convictions? Can the category of “fun
things” come to include vigorous physical exercise? Can the
category of “delicious dessert” come to include carob cake?
The inquiry seems a bit odd when it comes to preferences
that one views as unmediated, such as a taste for a
particular food. But it seems far less odd in the context of
lower-order instantiations for higher order preferences. I
want to be sophisticated; I will prefer x activity insofar as I
think it belongs in the category of things that make me
sophisticated. I would argue, though, that the mechanism is
not so different even for many more unmediated seeming
preferences: after all, one needs to be able to construct the
narrative of one’s preferences, and the narrative will
categorize the object of preference within the appropriate
category (I liked this carob cake because it was delicious).
Applying these concepts to preferences, consider the
interaction between preferences for particular things or
activities (lower-order preferences) and higher order
preferences, for such things as status and identity. Am I
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willing to pay $125 for a pair of black jeans made by Gap? It
may depend on whether Gap’s ads manage to persuade me
that the jeans are what cool people will be wearing this year.
How much will I charge to paint a fence? If I encounter Tom
Sawyer, who persuades me that painting a fence is really
fun, I might even pay to do so rather than asking for
payment.114 The question becomes whether I come to see
something lower-order as fulfilling the higher-order
preference. The jeans are “cool,” a member of the category
of “cool things.” Fence-painting has become a member of
the category of activities I do for fun. It may be that I
previously thought fence painting might be fun, I may have
had no view, or I may even have thought that it was not fun,
but was somehow amenable to being persuaded
otherwise.115
Higher order and lower order preferences are frequently
intertwined. How does Smith know how much he values a
particular stereo? He may like the way it sounds, and prefer
it to the equivalent amount of cash it costs. But part of his
assessment may turn on how he wants to think of himself, or
how he wants others to think of him. Does he want to think
of himself as “the guy who spent $50,000 on a stereo when
people are starving in Africa?” If he spends $50,000 on the
stereo, will he think of himself this way? The answers to
these questions will affect Smith’s preferences.
The indeterminacy plays out slightly differently in a very
societally-oriented higher order preference, such as the one
for status. What confers status is established in a complex
interaction between people and society. Ex ante, it is
impossible to know what will be in the set of statusconferring items and activities. When I was much younger, in
my social circles it was generally necessary (although not
sufficient) to own some particular set of record albums, a
pair of narrow-vale corduroy pants, a pair of black jeans and
a pair of blue jeans if one wanted to have even the most
minimal level of status. And of course, what gives status is
114

. See Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 1–2. Or maybe somebody
can persuade me that painting the fence will nicely complement my
otherwise too cerebral lifestyle, helping me achieve a healthier and betterrounded life.
115
. A perhaps facetious example: when I was younger, I was talked out
of liking the song “If You Could Read My Mind” by Gordon Lightfoot—a song
I was not 100% sure I liked—on grounds that only sappy people liked such
songs. I recall clearly going from experiencing pleasure at hearing the
song to experiencing annoyance and disdain.
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in a state of flux. Last year’s “it” wardrobe was, well, so last
year.
Given indeterminate lower order preferences and more
determinate higher preferences, how do people make
choices? There are many factors—including many that do
not relate in any straightforward manner to fundamentals.
Whether Jones will be tempted to buy item A may turn on
how item A is depicted and by whom (a close friend? A
popular celebrity? A billboard in Podunk?), and how Jones
views herself (as an early adopter? As a luddite? As Spartan?
As self-indulgent?). Recall, too, the Tom Sawyer example
above. Tom has to paint the fence. He offers others the
opportunity to paint the fence, telling them it will be fun. 116
The others take him up on the opportunity and do have fun.
Perhaps, had somebody required them to paint a fence the
day before they encountered Tom, or indeed, had somebody
paid them to do so, they would not have experienced it as
fun. It is hard to know. In one experiment, people valued a
bottle of wine differently depending on an anchor they knew
to be arbitrary: their own social security numbers.117 The
message is not that people can be manipulated into any old
preference. It is rather that there is considerable room for
various influences. It is hard to imagine that most people
would pay to be tortured118. But how is painting a fence
distinguishable from many forms of exercise that people
report experiencing as pleasant? (And how would those
people experience exercise if, as mentioned above, the
prediction in Woody Allen’s Sleeper came true, and it turned
out that people should have been lethargic couch potatoes
eating steak and hot fudge sundaes and smoking
cigarettes?). Consider, too, the concept of forbidden
pleasures. Is there an extra thrill for an underage drinker to
be flouting the law? Is there an extra thrill for an accountant
to “come close to the line” in an accounting determination?
(And if so, what does this say about where the line should
be?)
Contrast the picture I have painted thus far with a more
traditional economic picture of decision-making. The more
116

. See Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 1–2.
. See Ariely, Coherent Arbitrariness, supra note 3, at 76.
118
. There may, however, be some: psychological manuals, and
anecdotal accounts describe some people as drawn to behaviors that to
most people would seem quite horrible; consider in this regard the movie
The Night Porter.
117
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traditional picture involves acquiring and verifying
information pre-labeled as such, narrowly responsive to the
decision-making task, until the costs of getting more
information exceed the benefits. By contrast, the picture I
have painted is far less tractable. In many decisions, even
some simple ones, what’s important and relevant is not clear
at the outset; the decision may depend on a trajectory that
could have been otherwise. Consider my digital camera
example discussed above; even the process of making
apparently simple consumer choices is not so simple.
Consider my descriptions in Section 4 of decisions about
shampoo and clothing. As Douglas Kysar notes,
“[i]ndividuals in contemporary consumer cultures . . . define
their values, aspirations, and identities by reference to the
goods they consume, the leisure activities they undertake,
and the locations to which they travel.”119
Indeed, preferences and identity are inextricably
intertwined. I may, for instance, learn about how I balance
frugality and health when I choose a much cheaper product
that is a bit less healthy than a much more expensive one. 120
I may learn that I am not good at retaining technical details
when I compare my choice process in buying a digital
camera with that of somebody else. How much I like and
want a particular article of clothing may turn on how I
resolve the conflict between wanting to be stylish and
feeling that I and others will think me frivolous for caring and
for wasting time informing myself as to what it takes to be
stylish.
Moreover, Barry Schwartz argues that people may be
more apt to feel regret when confronted with many choices;
119

. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1700, 1758 (2003).
120
. In this regard, see the (perhaps semi-facetious) description of this
issue in a recent Op-Ed in the New York Times.
A friend in Seattle—I’ll call him Mitch, because that is his name—
reports a full-scale identity crisis in the toothpaste aisle. There he
stood, two coupons in hand. Was he ready to become a
rejuvenating-effects, tartar-protection kind of guy, or was he wed
to the fight against tobacco stains? And to think it all used to boil
down to squeezing from the bottom. The transformative power is
dizzying.
Stacy Schiff, Op-Ed., One Nation, With Niches for All, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2005, at A13.
The author continues, echoing another of Schwartz’s points: “The pressure
is on; the paralysis sets in.” Id.; see also Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole,
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 489, 491 (discussing a
related topic: signaling to one’s self in order to learn about one’s self).
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whatever they choose, they know of many other things they
could have done that might have made them happier. 121
There is some evidence suggesting that regret also
implicates identity concerns: that “people care not only
about the relative outcomes of a decision but also what the
chosen outcome implies for their own self-evaluation as a
competent, intelligent person.”122 Somebody choosing not to
take money offered in exchange for her blood may feel
better about herself than if she had never been offered the
money. Somebody may choose not to provide blood if doing
so becomes associated with money exchanges rather than
altruism, whether or not she would be paid.
George Loewenstein recounts another example. A couple
was ready to attend a daytime event to which they had
obtained a much-coveted invitation. They had a fourteenyear-old daughter who they had intended to leave at home
alone. Somebody else, somebody they had no reason to
suppose they would encounter again, who was also about to
attend the event asked them “do you think it is safe to leave
your daughter alone?”123 They realized that, whatever the
answer to the question, once it had been raised, they had to
stay home. The downside of something happening after they
had been warned would be too horrible. Presumably, the
question made salient not just what others would think of
them if something happened to their daughter, but what
they would think about themselves.
These examples suggest that decision making is
complex in ways that count—it is a way that people come to
learn and convey to others, who they are. It is critical not to
make too much of this observation, of course. It is not as
though each visit to a supermarket involves complicated
soul-searching. But in some cases, thinking about a
phenomenon in a way that takes more of a meta-perspective
may be helpful.
But is my account at all tractable, or is it a wholesale
abandonment of any parsimony whatsoever? While it will
necessarily be more complex than the traditional account, it
121

. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 71, at 147–65.
. George Loewenstein & Jennifer Lerner, The Role of Affect in
Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCE 619, 624 (Richard J.
Davidson et al. eds., 2003) (describing the experiments building in this
assumption).
123
. Telephone Interview with George Loewenstein, Professor of Econ. &
Psychology, Carnegie Mellon Univ., in Pittsburgh Pa. (Aug., 2004).
122
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does have some key unifying themes. The principal one is
that decision-making as I have described it is less costly than
the traditional alternative. Interestingly, in the traditional
account with fixed preferences, the transaction costs of
determining what exists and doing the rank ordering are
given short shrift—and this does not even take into account
the costs of retrieving the rank ordering. My account
hypothesizes that a methodology that forms preferences
(only) as needed minimizes costs. The next inquiry, of
course, is how we can determine what the methodology
might be: how the narratives form decision “rules.” The task
is difficult but by no means insurmountable. We might, for
instance, be able to formulate conditions under which money
might be presumptively preferred over many, if not most,
alternatives. I suggested earlier that we might be able to
figure out which preferences might be more or less stable.
An inquiry for determinants or presumptive determinants of
preferences and choices might be fruitful indeed. A critical
question, too, is how consequential a decision is. The less
consequential the decision, the more we might expect a
decision rule mainly focused on minimizing the actual
decision-making costs.
Whatever else a more nuanced and realistic account of
preferences and preference construction does, it should
leave in place as a special case the many preferences that,
through hard-wiring or some other reason, can safely be
treated as fixed. Such an account also should be willing to
sacrifice nuance for parsimony in appropriate circumstances.
We are far from knowing how to construct such an account.
But descriptive shortcomings of the existing account,
burgeoning research on determinants of preferences, and
the existing account’s weakening normative claims all argue
in favor of proceeding to that end.

5. WHAT FOLLOWS?
The foregoing argues that preference construction is
rational; it argues, as well, that there are many mechanisms
by which preferences are constructed. It offers a preliminary
sketch of some core features of preference construction:
that preferences are often not about traditional objects of
choice; that there is a continuum from narrative
independence to narrative dependence; and that narrative
dependence importantly implicates a link between a
particular choice and a higher level preference. It offers a
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brief consideration of the determinants of the narratives as
well as a sense of which ones might tend to be more stable.
Clearly, all this is quite preliminary; it will take a great deal
to make this diffuse account at a high level of generality and
abstraction into a more tractable account. That being said, I
discuss here several contexts in which my account may have
some application.

A) THE

DEBATE BETWEEN THE LIBERTARIANS AND THE NEW PATERNALISTS

Libertarians (“anti-paternalists”) argue that government
ought not to be paternalistic: people know better than
government what is good for them, and in any event, are
entitled to choose what they do, so long as they are not
hurting others. The new paternalists argue that because
people make mistakes and because preferences are
constructed, paternalistic-seeming interventions (ideally, in
the form of “soft” paternalism, de-biasing or providing
information rather than sanctioning bad choices) might be
consistent with what people really want and hence might be
consistent with libertarianism. As I argued in my paper AntiAnti-Anti Paternalism,124 the new paternalists have it wrong
in an important respect. There is indeed reason, as they
argue, to think that people’s choices may not be what they
really want—but there is no reason to think we have access
to or the ability to give what people really want when we
choose a policy intervention designed to affect their choices
(or preferences). That preferences are constructed does not
indicate that the government can figure out some true
underlying unmediated preference and honor “what people
really want” by promoting that preference. The notion of an
unmediated preference is untenable and incoherent. That
the new paternalists are wrong on this point does not help
the anti-paternalists, though: the anti-paternalists think that
what people really want is by definition what they choose,
and that people’s choices should therefore be sacrosanct;
that preferences are constructed shows that their position is
also untenable.
Still, the new paternalists may offer plausible policy
prescriptions even though they cannot justify paternalism on
libertarian grounds. They argue correctly that there is no
pure way to respect “choices.” Choices are necessarily

124

. Hill, supra note 32.

CLAIRE A. HILL, "THE RATIONALITY OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION (AND
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 689-742 (2008).

THE IRRATIONALITY OF

RATIONAL CHOICE)," 9(2)

2008]

PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION
733
dictated by context, including the applicable default rules125
—they are always constructed. It follows, then, that trying to
influence what people do, whether by sanction or by
something softer, does not constitute some impermissible
interference with people doing what they really want. Again,
what people choose is a complicated mix, arising from what
is often a path dependent trajectory. That preferences are
constructed suggests that there is no clear way for law to
respect what people really want—and that trying to respect
what people really want ought not to trump other legitimate
societal aims.

B) CONTINGENT

VALUATION

We need to value harms to quality of life such as
environmental harms; we have significant trouble doing so.
One typical method, contingent valuation, provides a notable
and notorious example. It is characterized by inconsistent,
incoherent and impossible valuations—saving forest A is
valued at $X, but saving all forests in a region might also be
valued at $X, the same amount; saving all forests in a
particular country might be valued at an amount equal to,
for instance, some large fraction of the country’s GDP and
saving forests and lakes might be valued at an amount that
is a large multiple of GDP.126
125

. The default rule is not just influential because it is easiest to go
along with. Indeed, there is evidence that a default rule or option is seen as
being endorsed by the people or entities responsible for offering the option
—often, the government.
See, e.g., Craig R. M. McKenzie et al.,
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 414, 414 (2006)
(“The results [of the experiments discussed in the article] indicate that
default effects occur in part because policymakers’ attitudes can be
revealed through their choice of default, and people perceive the default as
indicating the recommended course of action.”). A notable example
discussed in the article is the differing rates of organ donation in countries
where one has to opt in to donate versus countries where one has to opt
out not to donate. The donation rates in the opt out countries are much
higher. See Sheldon Zink, PhD, Rachel Zeehandelaar and Stacey Wertlieb,
MBe, Presumed versus Expressed Consent in the US and Internationally, 7
VIRTUAL MENTOR: AMA J. ETHICS,,Sept. 2005, http://virtualmentor.amaassn.org/2005/09/pfor2-0509.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
126
. The writing on contingent valuation is voluminous. See generally
Daniel Kahneman, The Review Panel’s Assessment: Comments by
Professor Daniel Kahneman, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 180, 185–94
(Ronald G. Cummings et al. eds., 1986); Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic
Preferences Or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to
Public Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 203, 204 (1999) (arguing that
contingent valuations are better understood as expressions of attitudes
than as indications of economic preference).
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My account of preference construction suggests that
these types of valuations should be particularly unstable.
The traditional observation— they represent cheap talk,
because the people who are being asked their valuation are
not typically being asked to write checks to pay their pro
rata portion of the amount they mention—is clearly correct.
But the traditional observation leaves something important
unexplained. Why should people’s valuations be as unstable
and inconsistent as they are? It is because they appeal to
several higher order values—as to each of these values,
there are many disparate realizations—and, in most cases,
there is no reason to anchor one realization in a lasting way.
Civic mindedness, caring for future generations, caring for all
creatures, caring for rich and poor, respect for something
greater than oneself, etc.—all are possible candidates for
higher order values one might have, and, again, all have
disparate realizations. Is there a way to limit or eliminate
harmful instability in this context? Absent something to
ground one or the other—the need to write a check, some
story that somehow sticks about one’s life, etc.—specifics of
the presentation may make all the difference. What if people
are asked to write checks? They might provide a coherent
rank-ordering, but one that might nevertheless be unstable.
Indeed, making money valuations can itself shape
preferences. People might value something differently when
money is taken out of the picture.
The intuition is
straightforward: people may donate blood if asked when
they would never “sell” it.127
Putting a price tag on
something may lead to viewing it as something that is paid
for—and something weighted against other things that are
paid for. In one experiment, parents picked up their children
later from a day care center after monetary penalties were
instituted for late pick-ups. Paying money transformed the
late pick-up from something they should not do to something
they could pay to do.128 Another experiment demonstrated
127

. The seminal work making the point in general and discussing the
blood example is RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1970).
128
. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(2000). This paper has been criticized on many grounds, including as to
the methodology used in the experiment. See, e.g., posting of Bryan
Kaplan
to
EconLog,
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/10/revenge_of_the.html (Oct. 27,
2005). However, the existence of the phenomenon it describes is
commonly accepted. See TITMUSS, supra note 127; see generally Bruno S.
Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
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that “support for a noxious facility [a repository to store
nuclear waste] decreased when monetary compensation to
host it was offered.”129 Intrinsic motivations to do the civicminded thing were crowded out.130 Again, in all these cases,
higher order values are coming into play, and are implicated
differently with respect to the same action in different
contexts.

C) NEGOTIATIONS

OF COMPLEX BUSINESS CONTRACTS

Consider complex business contracting for major
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions. In the
traditional picture, the endeavor is construed narrowly:
parties are straightforwardly and purposively engaged in
acquisition of particular information as to the subject matter
at issue. The focus is largely on ferreting out the truth from
people who know it but have an interest in not revealing it.131
Necessarily, such inquiries are quite tractable: what is
needed is a truth-revelation mechanism. Party X, deciding
whether to buy a share of a business from party Y, and if so,
on what terms, needs credible information that the business
is not a lemon. Perhaps Y can provide information that X can
verify to her satisfaction, or a credible signal. Or perhaps a
third party will rent her reputation to assure party X that the
business is not a lemon. Whether the business is a lemon is
a matter of fact; the only problem the parties face is that Y
has an incentive to depict her business as not being a lemon
whether or not it is. Even where the key issue is not Y’s
superior information and adverse incentives in relation to X,
but information that neither X nor Y may have, economic
analyses typically treat the information as mechanically
elicitable via directed inquiry.132 Perhaps specialists can
obtain the information (for instance, that a transaction is, or
is not, valid under applicable law).
In this picture, the lawyer is helping in information
acquisition and verification. He knows, through long
Analysis of Motivation Crowding Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997); TYLER
COWEN, DISCOVER YOUR INNER ECONOMIST (2007) (discussing how one’s children are
less likely to do the family dishes if they are paid to do so and hence feel
it’s a market transaction than if they’re not paid and are told it’s their
family responsibility); Hill, supra note 103, at 418–21.
129
. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 128, at 753.
130
. Id.; see also Hill, supra note 103.
131
. See Hill, supra note 16, at 569–70 (critiquing the overemphasis on
this type of “lemons” inquiry).
132
. Hill, supra note 16.
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experience, what information to seek, how to seek it, and
what verification techniques are available and appropriate.133
The parties listen to the problems and solutions and
negotiate until they reach the one that best meets their
needs. But this picture is hard to reconcile with the real
world. Long, ponderous negotiations with attention paid to
every semi-colon are a stark contrast to what happens when
the deal is done: the transaction documents go into a
drawer, to be taken out only if the parties stop getting along.
And what of all that time spent during the negotiations
arguing over each word? All lawyers would agree that the
transaction documents, written under enormous time
pressure by sleep deprived junior lawyers, surely are not
models of clarity to help judges figure out what the parties’
deal is—yet nobody goes back and fixes the document (or
the system, which inevitably produces documents of this
sort).134 Indeed, if the parties should cease getting along, the
chance that there will be something in the transaction
documents that allows them to impose costs on the other in
some legal process is exceedingly high. Why is this?135
One area of particularly contentious negotiation is
planning for contingencies, especially those that would be
undesirable for one or both parties. How will the parties
proceed if the business does poorly? What if one party wants
to terminate the arrangement or buy the other out, or be
bought out? Notwithstanding that the parties may be
experienced business people, discussions on these issues
often do not seem like dispassionate consideration and
discussion of the various options the lawyer(s) present. Why
not?
133

. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Gilson argues that
[l]awyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing
theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-thanperfect reality of effecting transactions in this world. Value is
created when the transactional structure designed by the business
lawyer allows the parties to act, for that transaction, as if the
assumption on which the capital asset pricing theory is based were
accurate.
Id. at 255.
134
. See Hill & King, supra note 71 (describing this dynamic).
135
. I am presently writing an account of this phenomenon. Claire A. Hill,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of
Incomplete Contracts (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Minnesota
Journal of Law, Science & Technology).
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An analogy to a marriage may be instructive. Imagine
two people who are engaged to be married consulting a
lawyer about a prenuptial agreement. Each party has chosen
a partner. Each has decided he or she can get along well
enough with the other – but the “closing” has not yet
occurred.
In the discussions with the lawyer, each is
conveying the sort of person he or she is. If one or both of
them have a well-thought-out plan for making sure they get
their “due” should the relationship dissolve, this in itself will
provide considerable information to the other party. It may
also provide information to themselves about their own
priorities and outlook.
In both cases—the transaction and the marriage—the
parties do have preferences as to the terms they want. But
the negotiations as to charged matters (the principal matters
negotiated for pre-nuptial agreements; such matters are
typically less prominent in transaction negotiations) are
occurring simultaneously with many other things. Each party
is deciding on the terms—but each is also deciding whether
to deal with the other party at all—what kind of person the
other person is based on how the other is acting, what kinds
of points the other is stressing, what kinds of contingencies
the other thinks warrants addressing and how the other
party is proposing addressing them, and so on. (Admittedly,
the parties discussing the pre-nuptial agreement are, we
hope, more committed to one another than the parties
negotiating their contract are at the early stages of the
negotiation.) Each party is also learning about itself. How
conciliatory is it? How much does it have at stake in getting
its way?
On this view, the lawyers need to be a bit careful in
bringing up less likely and unpleasant contingencies. There
may be a real cost as they are negotiated, without a
commensurate benefit. Should the parties get along the
contentious clause may not be needed—the parties will
probably come up with an accommodation that works for
both of them. And should the parties not get along, they will
probably each have an argument that whatever the contract
may say, they are entitled to something better. Why might
lawyers push for negotiations on these types of
contingencies beyond what might be in their clients’
interests? There is something to be explained, especially
since in comparable complex business transacting in
Germany, contentious negotiations over contingencies is not
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the norm.136 My argument in an article I wrote with a coauthor comparing German contracting practices with those
in the United States turns on lawyer agency costs. The U.S.
lawyers use forms that include every contingency they have
encountered—firms compete in part based on how inclusive
their forms are. There is no payoff to a lean and mean form;
there is, however, a considerable cost to not including a
contingency, even a remote one (but how would one know it
was remote?), that arises. By contrast, in Germany lawyers
use short contracts; the contracts are largely standardized,
and different firms use the same forms. The U.S. norm
involves aggressive lawyers, zealous advocates for their
clients. In Germany, a lawyer who negotiated in the
American style would be reviled. There are salient
differences in the court system as well. But the bottom line
is that in both countries, parties have preferences for
particular terms of their contracts, but their negotiations can
scarcely be properly or even importantly depicted as neutral
exchanges of direct and indirect information about those
terms. The terms are the wrong unit of account—the
preferences concern the terms but also higher order matters
as to the parties’ relationship.

6. CONCLUSION
The debate as to whether preferences are fixed,
amenable to discovery and revelation, pits economists
against scholars from many other disciplines. There are two
polar positions: preferences are fixed, and preferences are
infinitely malleable. Clearly, the truth lies somewhere in
between. Indeed, it is important not to caricature the neoclassical economists’ view. Presumably most sensible
economists would admit that hyper-determinate preferences
of traditional objects of choice are an extreme simplification
needed to make the model parsimonious and the modeling
tractable. But once a deviation is sufficiently large and
important, as is the case with the construction of
preferences, some sacrifice to parsimony and tractability
becomes a reasonable price to pay for increased explanatory
and predictive power.
This article sets forth the beginnings of a framework for
understanding preference construction, a process-based
model. Behavioral science is actively studying specific
136

. Id.
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determinants and mechanisms of preference construction; I
propose here a complementary, but more general, account. I
do so here as part of a broader endeavor, to re-conceive
rationality according to Herbert Simon’s view, that contextdependence and other complexities will necessarily be part
of the story.137 Indeed, preference construction, while
challenging the traditional law and economics model, fits
well into Simon’s conception of rationality. It does not fit
nearly as well into the thus-far dominant behavioral law and
economics model that emphasizes law and economics’
failure to acknowledge that people sometimes make
mistakes and sometimes are altruistic.
How are preferences constructed? The role of narrative
is key. Contrast preferences that may feel immediate and
unmediated with those that feel more as though they require
deliberation. In the former cases, the preference precedes
the narrative—if somebody asks a person why she likes
chocolate, her answer may be “well, because I do.” I fit liking
chocolate and seeking chocolate into my view of myself,
others, and the world but my experience with the chocolate
is apparently narrative-independent. Contrast this with a
case where I am trying to figure out whether a particular suit
makes me look professional. In the latter case, the
preference may be simultaneous with, or succeed, the
narrative.
What are people doing when they make a choice? Here,
again is where the economists’ paradigm, of traditional
objects of choice, revealed through action, leads them
astray. People’s preferences may be for traditional objects of
choice, or they may be for something higher-order that they
have concluded is well instantiated and realized by the
traditional object of choice. Again, I may prefer chocolate
because—well, because I prefer chocolate. But I may prefer
a particular sports car because I think it makes me be, and
seem, daring, and I have a preference to be and seem
daring. Indeed, economics more recently is exploring higher
order preferences—including the preference for status and
esteem,138 and, in the last few years, preferences relating to

137

. See generally Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and
Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25–
40 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds., 1986).
138
. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (1999); Richard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992).
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identity.139 Higher order preferences appreciably complicate
analyses of preferences, and in particular, the ability to rankorder in a stable and coherent manner. What satisfies a
preference for status? What satisfies a preference for
enhancing one’s sense of gender or racial identity? These
questions are increasingly being explored.
Law needs to care about the construction of preferences.
After all, law seeks to influence preferences, through
education,
public
interest
campaigns
and
public
announcements, as well in more traditional ways, using
punishments and rewards. Thus, law ought to understand
more about how preferences are constructed. Moreover, law
seeks to reflect the citizenry’s preferences; again, if
preferences differ depending on how they are elicited, the
consequences for law are considerable.
One of these consequences concerns how the law ought
to try to influence behavior. At a very basic level: jail or fines
are used to discourage disfavored conduct because people
dislike both considerably. Rewards and recognition are used
to encourage favored conduct because people like both
considerably. Jail, fines, rewards and recognition—especially
the first three—may implicate near—universal first order
preferences. While there are apparently people who want to
go to jail, it is a fairly safe assumption that most people
would do quite a bit to avoid doing so.
But what should be done about behavior that the law
wants to encourage or discourage, when classic means are
either unavailable or can be usefully complemented? Public
interest campaigns and other uses of law that seek to shape
norms should be crafted mindful of how people form
preferences. More profoundly, insofar as satisfying certain
types of preferences may be socially problematic, should the
government
consider
means
to
discourage
such
preferences? These sorts of inquiries are increasingly being
made; they can be better informed if we have a better sense
of how preferences are constructed.
Indeed, the relationship between higher and lower order
139

. The first paper was George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton,
Economics and Identity, 115 Q. J. ECON. 715 (2000). There have been two
subsequent papers by Akerlof and Kranton, George A. Akerlof & Rachel
Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9
(2005) and George A. Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Identity and Schooling:
Some Lessons for the Economics of Education, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1167
(2002). I provide many other citations in notes 3 and 4 of Hill, supra note
103.
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preferences suggests other applications. Lawmakers want to
do what their constituents desire, even if only to get reelected. That people wildly and inconsistently overvalue (and
at other times, undervalue) environmental benefits is a
source of frustration in this regard: what do people want,
and how much are they willing to pay for it? My account
suggests reasons why cheap talk and cheap sentiment in
this area are so pervasive and why more realistic valuations
are so difficult to achieve: higher order preferences are
strongly implicated, but not readily or stably translatable
into particular lower order preferences.
My account here suggests some critical determinants of
preference construction. The economics literature focuses on
traditional objects of choice (such as consumer goods or
leisure activities): in other words, lower order preferences.
But people have higher order preferences as well:
preferences as to what sort of preferences they want to
have, what sort of person they wish to be, and preferences
for abstract values.140 Their lower-order preferences are
often informed by higher-order considerations. Part of my
wanting to go snorkeling involves my having categorized
snorkeling as an activity within the category of “things
people do for fun.” Preferences are constructed when people
come to see particular choices as reflecting their higher
order preferences. This is of course not to say either that all
preferences are constructed or that preferences are infinitely
malleable. Rather, it is to take a middle ground position;
some preferences are determined in path-dependent
trajectories, and the trajectories themselves are of
considerable analytic interest. All this might seem to
abandon parsimony altogether. But I am optimistic that
traditional economic principles of cost-minimization can
help; it may be that decision rules and presumptive decision
rules we can identify serve much of the function fixed
preferences have served.
The agenda I propose is exceedingly difficult, and poses
serious analytic challenges. Indeed, I readily acknowledge
that my descriptive position here complicates the normative
task a policymaker faces. What role should preferences play
140

. Ultimately, there may not be a completely clear distinction between
these two types of preferences. Happiness is clearly higher-order; Wheaties
are probably lower-order. But what about a preference for better health vs.
a preference for curing cancer? But there are enough clear cases that the
distinction is tractable for my purposes.
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in policy if they are constructed in the way, and to the
extent, that I describe? How do we know what to encourage?
How do we know when people are better off? The
neoclassical paradigm offers ways of addressing these
issues; my alternative thus far does not.
But if the
neoclassical paradigm’s answers are wrong, and significantly
so, are they actually much better than indeterminate
answers that might be justifiable on pragmatic grounds, or
using “local” rather than overarching principles?
Much
research needs to be done, and the task is daunting indeed.
However, there does not seem to be a viable alternative.
Certainly, the neoclassical framework ought to be preserved
to the extent possible; indeed, it seems likely that it is not
infrequently right in many matters that lawmakers might
care about. But a richer account that accords better with
descriptive reality as well as intuition offers the promise of
better policymaking, grounded in an understanding of how
people really do form their preferences, and a recognition
that doing so other than in accordance with the neoclassical
model is not necessarily, or even typically, irrational.
To conclude, I echo the words of psychologists
Risekamp, Busemeyer and Mellers:
Debates about rationality focus attention far too narrowly. A
broader conversation—one that considers reasonable behavior,
adaptive behavior, and the environment in which choices occur—is
long overdue. We look forward to this shift in focus and the related
evidence and theories that will unfold in the next several
decades.141
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